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BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
1.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the prevailing economic conditions in Zimbabwe, which in turn
gave rise to a climate that promoted a spate of mergers in the country. By way of
conclusion, a brief discussion of the dissertation content is included.
By the end of 1999, the Zimbabwean economy was already in a severe macro-economic
crisis. GDP growth had fallen to below 2%, inflation during the year averaged 58,5%,
exports had stagnated, forcing a sharp contraction of imports, and the budget deficit,
fuelled by a rising interest burden, had risen to 9,8% of GDP. In the years 2000 to 2002,
the government not only failed to tackle this crisis, but also pursued a political agenda,
which had further adverse impacts in the economic sphere. The abrogation of the rule of
law clearly undermined business confidence, affecting current output and decimating
investment. Inflation reached a record 155%, exports and imports declined in US$ terms,
resulting in severe shortages of fuels and other essential inputs and the accumulation of
arrears on international payments and the budget deficit increased sharply to 24% of
GDP.
Although less easy to quantify precisely, the social impact of the sharp decline in
economic performance, superimposed on the effects of the lllV/AIDS pandemic, has
been devastating for the population at large. The last official poverty survey, which was
carried out in 1995, found that 76% of the Zimbabwe population had consumption
expenditures below the poverty datum line (86% of the rural population), with 47% being
in 'extreme' poverty (63% of the rural population)1. Poverty has certainly worsened in
both extent and depth since 1995.
A chain of events, which started in 1997, precipitated the present crisis. The underlying
cause is the e~cessive appropriation of national resources by the post-independence
government over the last two decades. This is reflected in budget deficits being incurred
every year since 1980. In the early years of independence, much was achieved in terms
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of extending health and education into the rural areas, and indeed many companies
prospered.
The advertising industry, like most sectors, was characterised by a serious boom in the
early to mid 90's. The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in
1991 had brought in an open market system, which saw an influx of, imported products.
With the sudden abundance in product choices a competitive drive was instilled in local
companies as they attempted to promote their goods.
During this time, the number of agencies grew from four agencies to literally hundreds
almost overnight. As the agencies battled for more and more clients, it became clear that
in order to succeed, an agency would have to reinvent itself in keeping with global trends.
It was during this time that many of the forward thinking agencies sought international
affiliations. Names such as Ogilvy & Mather, FCB, TBWA, Young & Rubicam, Saatchi
and McCann Elickson became synonymous with the advertising industry in Zimbabwe.
Indeed it was the agencies that managed to secure affiliations that recorded the highest
billings2• A direct result of the affiliation meant that accounts3 acquired by any member
affiliate in any country in the world earned local agencies a new client. Global accounts
such as Levers, Colgate Palmolive, automotive accounts such as BMW, Mercedes,
Peugeot, Mazda and Land Rover to name a few, Reckitt Benkiser, banks such as
Barclays, Standard Chartered, Coca Cola and Schweppes, ensured that these agencies
prospered from the related synergies that were being fostered world-wide.
Barker McCOlmack (also known as Barkers), CM & A and Adapt (a below the line4
agency) made up Ogilvy & Mather Zimbabwe while Carroll O'Donovan Hardy (also
known as CO'DH) was the exclusive TBWA affiliate in Zimbabwe. The Ogilvy and
Mather group in Zimbabwe comprised two of the oldest agencies in the country. Barker
1 Central Statistics Office (1998).
2 Scheduled advertising communication placed through the local print and electronic media.
3 This refers to the actual portfolio of each client that an agency services.
4 An agency that concentrates on producing promotional material as opposed to advertising
material th~t is featured in print or electronic media. forms. Examples include brochures, posters,
banners, billboards etc
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McCmmack dates back to the late 50's while CM & A was formed in 1976. Carroll
O'Donovan Hardy TBWA was formed in 1991.
The unique characteristics of the three agencies formed significant identity features,
which attracted and retained much of their respective clients. Barker MacCormark
represented a service that had been tried, tested and above all a stability that was
suggested by its years in the industry. CM & A on the other hand was the less renowned
relative. The agency was initially used to attract large accounts that due to the
exclusivity5 rule could not be accommodated at Barker McCormark. With time, however,
the agency also acquired its own clientele independent of Barkers. Canoll O'Donovan
Hardy TBWA by contrast, offered a breath of fresh air. It was small, young, and vibrant
and had a daring the older agencies did not espouse.
Through much of the early 90's all three agencies continued to improve their billings.
This was however short lived. The down turn of the Zimbabwe economy which began in
eamest in 1997 ushered a new era for businesses in this country.
The exchange rate was becoming increasingly overvalued in real terms and exports were
stagnating. When it was announced that the war veterans were to be given unbudgeted
payments of a magnitude, which threatened the fiscal targets, external investors withdrew
from the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and the domestic markets foresaw an imminent
devaluation. On the so-called 'black Friday' in November 1997, the cUITency collapsed
to Z$24 but was brought back by Reserve Bank intervention to around Z$18 to the US$.
The response of the authorities to the 'black Friday' crisis significantly worsened the
export environment. In addition to restoring the nominal Z$/uS$ rate to a level which
was still overvalued, the right of exporters to maintain foreign cUITency denominated
accounts was removed. The time required to repatriate export proceeds was reduced and
"emergency" tariffs were introduced on various commodities, distorting the protection
5 The advertising agencies' governing body ADMA prohi:>its a single agency from servicing more
than one client from a particular industry.
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structure without measurable benefit to exporters6. In response both to policy measures
the markets deemed unsustainable and political factors (in particular Zimbabwe's
intervention in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), the currency collapsed
again during 1998. The Reserve Bank was no longer able to intervene and the exchange
rate ended the year at Z$38 to the US$, a level which was maintained for the next 19
months to July 2000 when it was further devalued to the current Z$55 to the US$.
The cumulative decline in export receipts from 1996 to 2001 (of 37%) is the reason for
the current extreme shortage of foreign currency. This has been characterised by
shortages of fuel and crucial inputs to production, rapid escalation of prices of imported
goods (including fuel and electricity) and increasing levels of default on external
payments (US$630 million by end April 2(01).
Trends that have continued to disappoint the business community in Zimbabwe have seen
the authorities expressing a reluctance to devalue the currency, arguing that depreciation
is highly inflationary while bringing no assured increase in export proceeds. Instead, they
have prescribed price controls and labour market regulations, which further exacerbated
the problem. The Zimbabwean price system has been characterised by extensive controls
over prices of basic commodities. Government determined maximum selling price for
most basic items. This policy resulted in the creation of artificial shortages as producers
began to deliberately cut back on production to minimise losses.
Business confidence in the country reached levels of all time lows, with many companies
facing closure as they struggled to operate under these stringent conditions. Companies
began reducing their marketing expenditure as they battled to keep up with associated
rising costs while facing severe shrinkage in their overall growth patterns. Immediately
hit were companies that relied on imports for their raw materials or finished goods. Being
a land locked country whose main source of wealth was agriculture, most raw materials
used in industry are imported. As a result of the foreign currency shortages, the cost of
6 Feta Services & Techfin Research (1999).
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most products escalated, as companies began sourcing cunency at black market rates
(cunently Z$1450: US$l as opposed to the pegged official rate ofZ$55:US$1).
The Advertising Industry suffered heavy losses as companies curtailed their advertising
spend7 to what was barely necessary to maintain a presence. Many accounts even became
dOlmant as the clients could no longer afford nor justify this marketing expense which
many consider a luxury in times of economic strife. With the mushrooming of more and
more agencies, the advertising pie was cut to such minute pieces that growing the
business through the acquisition of new accounts was becoming an exceptionally difficult
task The advertising industry was in short becoming saturated.
Reduced volumes were not confined to the advertising industry. Many companIes
suffered as less and less of their products were being consumed Instead of futile attempts
at growing existing business ventures, some companies began looking at other ways of
growing and retaining their businesses. For many companies, mergers or outright
acquisitions offered an immediate solution. In the last three years the following mergers
between former rivals have been concluded in Zimbabwe:
• Bard Discount House, udc and First Merchant Bank to form African Banking
Corporation (Financial Institutions).
• Founders Building Society and IntermaIket Discount House to form Intermarket
(Financial Institutions).
• National Merchant Bank and Merchant Bank of Central Africa (Financial
Institutions).
• KPMG (Bulawayo) and Ndlovu and Associates (Chartered Accountants).
• Lion Insurance Company and Zimnat (Insurance Companies).
• TZI and Art Corporation (Manufacturing).
• Century Bank and Leasing Company ofZimbabwe (Financial Institutions).
• Pigott Maskew and General Belting (Manufacturing).
• Lyons Zimbabwe and Dairibord (Dairy Products and Ice Cream).
7 This refers to the total amount that companies allocate for the advertising expenditure.
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• Coca-Cola and Schweppes Cordials (Beverages).
In keeping with this wave of mergers, it became clear that if any of the three agencies
were to survive the harsh realities of the Zimbabwean economy, they had to consider
strategies, which offered long term benefits in terms of growth and prosperity. It was
against this background that the shareholders of the three agencies embarked on merger
talks in mid 2000. The results of the talks would only come into fiuition in September
2001 when the merger was finally concluded.
The major selling point of the merger at the time was not so much the creation of the
most formidable agency on the Zimbabwean market, but that it was concluded with no
redundancies in manpower. There were also no major conflicts between existing clients
and most had expressed optimism at the merger and pledged their full support for it. The
shareholders of the three agencies felt that the merged company would benefit more from
the maintenance of the Ogilvy and Mather affiliation, rather than the TBWA link. The
resulting transaction saw Carroll O'Donovan Hardy TBWA ceasing to exist as an entity
and its members of staff being split strategically between Barker MacCormack and CM
& A in an attempt to enhance the performance of the Ogilvy and Mather group in
Zimbabwe. Table 1.1 lists the staff complement of each agency pl'e and post merger. The
additions in the post merger numbers result from the addition of Carroll O'Donovan
Hardy members of staff.
Table 1.1
No. of People Barkers CM&A CO'DH
PreMerger 32 17 21
Post Merger 45 25 N/A
At the onset of the merger, CM & A lost five key members (29.4% of original members)
of staff. By the middle of 2002, the merged group had suffered from a spate of further
resignations, this time from former Carroll O'Donovan Hardy employees. No less than
ten (47.6% of original) employees had resigned from Barkers, and two (9.5% of original
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members) from CM & A. Further, many clients began expressing dissatisfaction at the
new order ofdoing business with some even moving their business to other agencies.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The study will assess what post merger management strategies are required to ensure the
success of mergers in generaL It will also investigate what post merger strategies are in
place at Ogilvy and Mather Zimbabwe and how effective the chosen strategy is at
maintaining the group's aim at remaining the dominant force in the advertising industry
in Zimbabwe.
The management dilemma is how to retain and attract key accounts and suitable
personnel to ensure Ogilvy and Mather maintain their position as the leading advertising
agencies in Zimbabwe.
The future success of mergers worldwide is often viewed with trepidation and many large
mergers have been unsuccessful. This is often because of the over concentration on
fmancial issues at the expense other strategic and socio- cultural factors during a merger.
The study will propose a balanced view of strategic and socio-cultural post management
issues and suggest a best practice. The question is "What are the post merger
requirements for a successful merger in the adverlising industry in Zimbabwe?"
As the failure rate in mergers is unacceptably high, lessons learnt from successful
mergers can help to increase the future success rate ofmergers in general.
1.3 The Objectives of the Study
The objectives of the study are:
• To what extent are mergers in the advertising industry likely to succeed.
• To determine the impact ofmanagement decisions on the success of a merger.
• To determine what are the feelings of the employees towards these decisions.
• To establish what is the effect of the management decisions adopted on employee
attitude and performance.
• To ascertain the impact ofthe managerial decision on the existing client base.
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• To examine the extent to which the group will be effective in generating new
business.
The study will review in depth the significance of the following aspects, which are
considered critical to post merger management and assess the extent to which the





A survey will be conducted in the form ofa questionnaire that will be distributed to
everyone who was an employee ofany the three agencies at the time of the merger. The
fmdings of the questionnaire are expected to provide answers to validate the objectives of
the study.
1.4 The Significance of the Study
The significance of this study is to assist management at Ogilvy and Mather Zimbabwe to
assess the effectiveness of decisions adopted at the time of the merger, and assess the
impact of these decisions on overall growth accruing from the ability to maintain key
employees and ensure effective employee performance. The study will draw on
information from successful global mergers in general. The lessons drawn therein will
help to guide management to put to practice tried and tested methods at Ogilvy and
Mather Zimbabwe.
1.5 The Structure of the Study
The structure ofthe study will be as follows:
• Chapter 2: Literature Review. A theoretical model will be developed from
the theory available. This model will serve as a basis for analysing the current
problem of the Ogilvy and Mather Group in Zimbabwe. The theory reviewed will
focus on the areas of organisational culture, organisational structure, leadership, and
change management. The choice of these topics is justified by the pertinent role each
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plays ifused effectively in the proper functioning of today's business and particularly
in a post merger environment. For the study of Ogilvy and Mather in Zimbabwe, the
following detail in each topic will be undertaken:
• Organisational culture - a review of organisational culture models and the
evaluation of the one best suited to the advertising industry after a merger.
• Organisational Structure - a review of organisational structures and suggest the
structures best suited to the organisational objectives and culture.
• Change Management - suggest how best, management and staff should handle the
changes brought about by the merger.
• Leadership - review leadership models and suggest the profile required to
succeed in different circumstances
• Chapter 3: Case Study. This chapter will narrate the situation at each of the
three agencies within the Ogilvy and Mather Group, before and after the merger. The
narration will be based for each scenario on the type of organisational culture,
structure, leadership style and change management that were in place prior to the
merger and that prevail following the merger.
• Chapter 4: Evaluation. This chapter will evaluate the case study against the
formulated theory model. Included in this chapter will be responses from the
questionnaires distributed to the members of staff. A detailed analysis of the results
will be carried out and this will indicate how effective the post merger strategies in
place within the Ogilvy and Mather group have been.
• Chapter 5: Recommendations and Conclusions. Based on how good or bad
things are within the group, this chapter will consolidate the findings of the study and
make value adding suggestions based on best practice.
• Appendices: This will be an attachment of graphs and tables that make up the
detailed analysis of the questionnaires collected.
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1.6 Summary
The Zimbabwean economy had reached historically low levels in terms of its
performance. Coupled with this, the country's volatile political environment saw many
once prosperous business ventures struggling for survival. One of the immediate options
followed by many organisations was the undertaking of mergers with similar or related
companies in a bid to ensure continued growth. Among the hardest hit industries by the
economic decline was the advertising industry. In order to maintain its market
dominance, the Ogilvy and Mather group of Zimbabwe (comprising Barker McCormark
and CM & A) embarked on discussion with a smaller rival, Carroll O'Donovan Hardy
TBWA. The discussions would culminate in a merger of the three agencies in September
2001.
From the onset the merger was characterised by a series of staff resignation particularly
from Carroll O'Donovan Hardy and CM & A. In addition, existing clients began to
complain about the handling of their business.
The study will examine the causes for these grievances and assess the impact of the
group's post merger strategies aimed at consolidating the merger. It will examine the
group's capability at maintaining the sustainable growth that was envisaged at the time of
merger. An assessment of whether post merger strategies at Ogilvy and Mather
Zimbabwe are successful in terms of their impact on employee and customer retention
will be conducted. Based on the findings, a best case scenario will be mapped out so as to
ensure Ogilvy and Mather maintain their market dominance of the advertising industry in
Zimbabwe
The next chapter will develop a theoretical framework for strategies aimed at successful
post merger management. This framework will be used to analyse the effect of the
merger at Ogilvy and Mather and provide guidelines on the best way possible in a post
merger environment of its nature.
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CHAPTER 2
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN CONTEXT
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will present theories on mergers and acquisitions, beginning with an outline
on the major driving forces and the perceived benefits of mergers and acquisitions in a
global context. Certain conditions in the global economic environment have encouraged
many organisations to look at mergers and acquisitions as means of economic growth and
viability. An enabling market for mergers and acquisitions has been encouraged by the
following factors:
• Changing market conditions
• Increasing availability of capital
• The availability of more companies for sale
• The easing of regulations in Europe
• The need for companies to share risk
The theory presented will dwell on the following strategic issues:
• Organisational Culture - "Organisational culture represents the sum total of beliefs,
values, attitudes, ideologies, and behaviour patterns and norms which are shared and
adhered to by employees in a particular organisation" (Cass, 1991). Organisational
culture compatibility has been identified as the major cause of merger failure, hence
its emphasis in this study (Cartwright and Cooper, 1995). There are various
theoretical models that have been developed on organisational culture, namely:
• The David and Singh Model
• The Nahavandhi and Malekdadeh Model.
These models have been especially selected for review because of their relevance in
culture issues in the service industry, which means they can be applied to the culture
issues at Ogilvy and Mather Zimbabwe.
• Organisational Structure - "Organisational structure refers to issues such as (a)
how jobs are defined, (b) how jobs are combined or grouped (c) the appropriate size
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of each work group, (d) management span of control, (e) reporting relationships, (f)
how people and technology will be integrated (g) how the organisation will be
exposed to the "outside" world and how (h) authority will be distributed" (Cass,
1991). Organisational structures thus provide the opportunity to achieve some of the
perceived benefits of mergers, for example:
o Rectifying management ineffectiveness, as more innovative managers unlock
value after the merger. These managers would more effectively redefine jobs,
how jobs are combined, establish the optimum size of work groups, and
introduce accountability based reporting systems.
o Achieving synergies due to cost cutting and achieving economies of scale.
Increasing span of control, maximising use of technology and consolidating
authority would help in achieving synergies.
Organisational structures should enhance the organisational efficiency, effectiveness
and economy, be compatible and supportive of the organisation's strategic vision and
create an enabling environment for a sales and performance culture.
• Change Management - Human beings by nature prefer a stable and predictable
environment as it gives them a 'comfort zone'. In the event of a merger, management
must anticipate resistance to change and develop a plan to manage the whole change
process. Resistance to change, change process models and elements of successful
organisational change will be discussed and linked to mergers.
• Leadership - The enduring theme in effective organisational culture, structure and
change management will emerge as a strong leadership. Ultimately it is the leadership
type and style that harnesses the strategic plans of an organisation post merger and
that can mean success or outright failure.
Each of these strategic elements, if properly implemented play a pertinent role in the
success of businesses in general and in a post merger environment in particular. There is
a clear strategic fit between each of these elements and that will be demonstrated in the
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chapter. For each strategic element, various models will be presented and a best
alternative suggested for a post merger environment particularly to suit the advertising
industry scenario in Zimbabwe. Based on the theory, the research will illustrate in later
chapters the objectives ofthis research, which are to determine:
• The extent to which mergers in the advertising industry are likely to succeed
• The impact of management decisions on the success of the merger
• The feelings and attitudes of the employees towards these decisions
• To ascertain the impact ofmanagerial decision on the existing client base
• To what extent the group will be effective in generating new business after the
merger.
Mergers and acquisitions, if managed properly can improve competitive advantage and
increase profitability, however many fail because of the neglect or underestimation of one
or all of these key strategic factors.
2.2 Reasons for the Global Trend Towards Mergers & Acquisitions
Since the 1980's, mergers and acquisition have become a worldwide growth industry
(Cartwright and Cooper, 2001). Shareholders consider mergers and acquisitions as a
strategy for wealth creation. However, it is estimated that more than half the mergers and
.acquisitions concluded have proven financially unsuccessful. In many mergers, the
emphasis of the business transaction is often on financial and strategic factors. This is
done at the expense of human factors, which many have attributed to the major reason
why most mergers and acquisitions result in failure. The trauma associated with mergers
and acquisitions is very real for people who have been subjected to the associated
changes in their work environment. The problems such as who to lose, who to retain
manifest themselves from the onset of the merger talks, and continue through its
conclusions as fears of new reporting structures, redefined responsibilities and changes in
the overall working environment emerge. Left unmanaged, many of the human merger
problems result in high staff turn over and poor performance, which can continue after
the conclusion of the merger.
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As the inadequacies of traditional, rational econOIDlC explanations of merger and
acquisition failure are increasingly being recognised, more progressive companies are
coming to realise that what happens to the employees involved and their organisational
cultures, cannot be considered as separate and distinct from what happens to the
organisation. There are therefore, two important human factors to merger and acquisition
success, which determine the speed and effectiveness with which integration can be
achieved. They are:
• The culture compatibility of the combining organisations, and the resultant cultural
dynamics.
• The way in which the merger/acquisition and integration process IS managed
(Cartwright and Cooper, 2(01).
Typically it is only once the ink: has dried and the initial euphoria of the merger has worn
off that the question of what shall we do next arises or is given any serious consideration.
After a serious analysis of many mergers and acquisitions, it would appear that most are
as a result of good fortune rather than a clearly mapped out management strategy. After
the sealing of the deal, what subsequently follows is a journey into the virtual unknown
(Cartwright and Cooper, 2001). Most organisations do not anticipate the scale of the
resultant problems after a merger has been concluded. Many find themselves having to
cope on a crisis-by-crisis basis, rather than through the proactive management of the
anticipation of problems before they get out ofhand.
2.2.1 Factors that have led to an increasing number ofmergers around the world
1. Changing market conditions
With the focus of the business environment turning to a global market, many
organisations have found opportunities where it was once unthinkable. The establishment
of the European Union and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty have been influential.
The net result of these conditions has been to stimulate merger and joint venture activities
as the need to respond quickly has meant that strategic acquisitions and alliances:
• Have been the only expedient growth options available
• Offer a solution to restrictive legislation for foreign investors
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• Act as a means ofeliminating competition and controlling the market.
2. Increasing availability of capital
Acquisitions can be financed from surplus funds. The global trends have seen the
reduction of interest rates, making the option of borrowing attractive for many
organisations.
3. More companies for sale
There has been an increasing pool of potential buyers and sellers. This has been attributed
in part to the retirement age that many post world war entrepreneurs have reached hence
the offer of their businesses up for sale. Further, the past two decades of the last century
were characterised with major changes, in the manner in which businesses are run. These
changes were political, social and economic in nature. Companies that failed to embrace
these changes lost considerable marlcet share or competitive edge, and in return, found
themselves in precarious situations that could only be salvaged through a merger or an
acquisition.
4. Easing of regulations in Europe (e.g. the repeal of the Exchange Control Act)
Political climate and the prevailing attitudes and policies of individual governments
influence merger and acquisition activity. In the UK for example, The Mergers and
Monopolies Commission is considered to "lack teeth" and in any event ever consulted in
the case of mega-mergers. A recent analysis of the pattern of the pattern of US
acquisitions and mergers suggests that 'right of centre' administrations stimulate activity.
(Gartrell and Yantek, 1980)
5. The need to share risk
In capital-intensive industries, and in areas where the cost of research and new product
development is high, organisations have frequently moved to combine with others in
response to the need to share risk and technology.
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2.2.2. The perceived benefits ofmergers
According to Von Georg, Alessandra and Habir, 1994 the perceived benefits of merger
are:
1. Enhancing shareholder value by rectifying managerial ineffectiveness, as more
innovative managers unlock value after a merger.
2. Achieving synergies due to cost-cutting and achieving economies of scale. With
increasing technology costs, bigger groups with a critical mass make the investment
cost effective.
3. Access to important assets. The networking possibilities that are available after a
merger allow companies to benefit from related synergies.
4. Increasing market share. With pressure on margins, it is critical to increase market
share, diversifY earnings and increase product lines in order to reduce earnings as
business conditions vary.
Financial and strategic issues are the main consideration in mergers. Organisational or
socio-cultural issues are seldom considered, although critical. The remainder of this
literature review will thus focus the importance of each of the following strategic factors,







Extensive financial analysis and planning is often undertaken before the merger.
However, seldom are socio-cultural factors considered. According to a managerial survey
carried out in the UK, underestimation of the difficulties of merging two cultures was
rated as being a major contributory factor to mergers and acquisitions failure. Recent
estimates of merger failure vary from a pessimistic 77% reported by some US studies, to
a more optimistic 50% quoted by several UK sources. The successful outcome of mergers
has increasingly become dependent on the wide scale integration of people, their systems,
procedures, practices and organisational cultures (Cartwright and Cooper, 1995).
Cultural sharing and adherence to understanding, together result in integrated, well co-
ordinated activity are necessary to achieve the benefits on combination. Managing
cultural and power issues is an essential task if the acquiring :finn expects to implement
coherent post acquisition strategy (David and Singh, 1993). Cultural compatibility is
critical to post acquisition strategy.
2.3.1 Evaluation of Organisational Culture Models
Strong performance culture and sales culture are essential in the modem service industry
environment due to increased competitiveness. The David and Singh and Nahavandhi and
Malekdadeh models have been chosen due to their relevance in culture issues in service
industry mergers.
2.3.2 Kenneth David and Harbir Singh Models
The David and Singh model is relevant to this study as the concepts of cultural distance,
power asymmetry, national, professional and organisational culture can be applied
effectively to service industry mergers. Cultural distance and power asymmetry pose
potential problems for all co-ordinated social activity. Cultural distance refers to the fact
that before they enter organisations, individuals have already been socialised in their
national culture and frequently socialised in a professional culture - such as legal,
accounting, economic, and information technology. No matter how rigorous the regime
of corporate selection and training, individuals retain their earlier socialisations that affect
their perception and understanding (David and Singh, 1993).
24
All human societies are structured with unequal distribution of power. Power differentials
or asymmetries always pose the potential for non-eompliance, opposition, conflict and
change. Figure 2.1 illustrates triple socialisation and cultural distance.




























Progressive socialisations and Cultural distance
Source: (David and Singh, 1993)
As mergers occur, people from different backgrounds are combined, making the
challenges organisations face very vast. Open mindedness and flexibility are required in
these mergers
2.3.3 Definition of Cultural Impact and Relative Deprivation:
"Cultural impact refers to threats to effective integration of post acquisition activities
close to imperfectly shared understandings"(David and Singh, 1993)
''Relative deprivation refers to threats to effective integration of post acquisition activities
of non - compliant behaviour" (David and Singh, 1993).
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Figure 2.2 illustrates that in onler to have coordinated activity, merging companies
should endevour to have a shared organisational culture and neutralise relative
deprivation. Since this is an ideal and thus not always attainable, companies must strive
for a compromise that will be of benefit to the new organisation.











Turmoil • Compliance with resentment
• Convert subversion of
programs
Source: (David and Singh, 1993)
When full integration of business units is required for a post acquisition strategy, then
even minor cultural distance can be a problem - even in the case of a friendly merger
between strategically related companies (Reinhold and Frank, 1995). Culture distance is
not an implacable force but it can be manipulated in line with one's practical interests:
over communicated in onler to wreck alliances or under communicated in order to forge
them. Relative deprivation on the other hand can be neutralised by imposing meritocracy
(David and Singh, 1993).
2.3.4 Conclusions reached by David and Singh are that:
1. There is always cultural distance between an acquiring firm and a target firm;
they always differ in organisational culture and may also differ in professional
and national culture (David and Singh, 1993)
2. Cultural distance does not have automatic impacts; it is not an implacable force
(David and Singh, 1993) Organisational learning, communication, tolerance and
flexibility on the part of the merging entities can lower the culture risk.
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3. Acquisition cultural risk varies according to the (planned or unplanned) post
acquisition post- acquisition regime imposed by the acquiring finn on a target
film (David and Singh, 1993). Effective cultural integration is an ongoing
imperative process, which requires the full commitment of all parties in the
merger process.
These conclusions offer a suggested approach to organisational culture issues in a post
merger environment. In the Ogilvy and Mather example, management of the three
agencies would have to agree that, while alike in many ways the agencies have different
cultural norms. Once this has been established, a list of the pros and cons of each culture
could be noted so as to pave a way forward to the construction of new culture that can be
comfortably embraced by members of all the agencies. Defining a new culture can only
be done in line with the groups' strategic vision and organisational goals and objectives.
2.3.5 Nahavandhi and Malekzadeh Acculturation Models
Nahavandhi and Malekzadeh argue that in addition to being a financial transaction,
mergers are primarily the coming together of organisations on the human and cultural
level (David and Singh, 1993). They deal at length with the concept of acculturation.
"Acculturation is change induced in (two cultural) systems as a result of diffusion of
cultural elements in both directions" (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1994). Figure 2.3










Source: (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1994)
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• Assimilation is a process by which one group willingly and totally adopts the identity,
culture and practices of the other group (David and Singh, 1993). This is an ideal
situation in a merger as it eliminates potential conflicts.
• Integration occurs when members of an acquired firm want to maintain most of their
valued cultural and organisational practices and cultural elements. This is the likely
scenario in concentric and horizontal mergers. (David and Singh, 1993).
• Separation involves one group wanting to and actively trying to maintain all its
cultural elements, and attempting to remain autonomous and independent from the
other group (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1994). This is likely in scenario to vertical
mergers. Separation engenders a fair amount of conflict and is likely to be difficult to
implement.
• Deculturation involves the loss ofcultural identity and refusal to adopt a new one
(Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1994). This is the likely situation in a hostile take over
of a similar operation in order to achieve economies or scale or synergy.
Factors that determine the choice of acculturation mode are shown in tabulated form in
figure 2.4 for the acquiring firm and for the acquired firm respectively:






Source: (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1994)
For the acquired firm
Strength ofculture
Perception of acquirer
The acquirer, as the dominant party, would like to have the dominant culture, strategy,
and leadership and decide on the nature of the organisational structure. The acquired
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finn's acculturation mode on the other hand depends on its culture strength and its
perception ofthe acquirer.
Figure 2.5 combines all concepts and illustrates the acquirer's modes of acculturation in
different organisations.
Figure 2.5 The Acquirer's Modes of Acculturation
MulticulturalisllJrn.....I-- CUlture -;.~ Uniculturalism
Type I .....1-----------Leadership-------•• Type IT










Source: (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1994)
The model on Figure 2.5 is of value in determining the mode of acculturation in specific
circumstance. It is also applicable in the "merger of equals" to determine if there is an
acculturation mode congruence. It is however limited in that for example,
multiculturalism can exist in mechanistic environment i.e. flexible and inflexible
characteristics can exist in an organisation. In addition to the degree of relatedness can be
mixed in the merger of divisions of two organisations. It is therefore necessary to
breakdown the units being merged in applying this model in order to avoid a "one size
fits all" syndrome.
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Source: (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1994)
The model in figure 2.6 is of value for both the acquired firm and the junior partner in a
"merger of unequals" Its limitations will be the differences of strength of culture and
perception of the attractiveness of the acquirer in the various units of the acquired firm.
As in the case of the acquirer's modes of acculturation model, it is therefore necessary to
breakdown the units being merged in establishing the mode of acculturation.
2.3.6 Acculturation Stress and Congruence
Acculturation stress is caused by conflict and disruption created when coming together
with another culture. The level of stress is dependent upon congruence between various
organisational elements of two levels: intra- and inter-organisational. The higher the
congruence at both levels the lower the conflict and stress (David and Singh, 1993).
Agreement on any of the three cultural modes of integration, assimilation or separation is
likely to ease the merger process. Disagreement can lead to deculturation. In addition
acculturation should be looked at as an evolutionary and dynamic process that requires
careful monitoring and implementation. Strong Company vision and leadership helps to
achieve cultural congruence
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In order to have co-ordinated activity, the organisation should endeavour to have some
shared organisational culture and neutralise relative deprivation. However as the ideal is
not always possible, compromise should always be reached for the benefit of the new
organisation.
2.3.7 Suitable Approach on Organisational Culture Issues in a Service Industry
Following a Merger:
• There should be comprehensive analysis of existing cultures. The cultural strengths
and weaknesses should be reviewed in a positive and constructive manner in order to
get all key issues out in the open (David and Singh, 1993) the organisation should
then develop a shared organisational culture and neutralise relative deprivation.
• The characteristics of the desired culture should be defined. The characteristics of the
desired culture must be clearly defined, based on the Strategic Vision, key objectives,
fmancial performance and market positioning strategy. This tends to reinforce and
clarify the organisation's focus, as well as management commitment to the change
process itself (David and Singh, 1993). Strong performance culture and sales culture
are essential in the competitive modem service indusuy
Staff should be open minded and flexible. Acculturation mode incongruence is a
possibility and therefore staff should be united in diversity. Strong Company vision and
leadership helps achieve this.
The models of Kenneth David and Harbir Singh and Msaneh Nahavandi and Ali
Malekzadeh help in structuring the organisation culture issues in mergers, which are
likely to be critical as strategic issues in future mergers.
The next section will focus on organisational structure and provide a link between




This section will discuss the determinants of organisational structures. As organisational
structures provide the framework within which the merged entities are managed, their
importance in the post-merger management in the organisation will be analysed and
linked to organisational culture issues. The integration modes and resulting organisational
structures will be linked to the merger. In conclusion, issues discussed will be
consolidated in order to suggest organisational structure principles that enhance the
performance of the merged organisation.
2.4.1 Detennioaots of Organisational Structures
Determinants of organisational structure are strategy, technology, people, and size and
structure (Stoner and Wankel, 1986). Alfred D Chandler argued that "structure follows
strategy" as the mission and overall goals of an organisation will help shape its design.
An adaptive dynamic strategy and a rigid static structure are not compatible (Cass, 1991).
The competitive advertising environment is forcing agencies to have strategies which
support sales and marketing goals by accelerating the flow of information between the
agency's personnel and its customers, both existing and potential. As a result structures
are flatter with lines of communication and power well distributed in order to be
responsive to the customer needs. Fewer layers also enable senior managers to make
better decisions with a better feel for the market place, as they are closer too the front line
staff.
Technology probably has and will have the greatest impact on the today's organisations.
As technology is increasingly being used as the distribution channel, in selVice industries,
this is resulting in the reduction or closure of branch networks. Down sizing and
economies of scale of technology expenditure after a merger is usually one of the
compelling reasons for a merger. Technology has the effect of reducing layers of
management and reducing the number of clerical staff as standard procedures are
automated.
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People ultimately make or break an organisation as technology; strategy or structure
cannot exist without people. "The savings needed after a merger will not come from
eliminating lower paid people but will result from having fewer highly paid people, with
broader spans of control, greater management skills and accountability, and supervisory
responsibility which may cross existing functional boundaries"(Cass, 1991)
If merging companies were characterised by functionalised tall organisational structures,
a paradigm shift will be needed to transform to cross- functional flat structures. For flat
cross-functional structures to succeed, employees should be highly skilled, empowered,
team oriented and communications lines upward, downward and horizontal should be
open.
Both size and structure of an organisation and its sub units influence its structure. Bigger
organisations with many services are likely to be hierarchical compared to small niche
businesses, which are likely to have a flat structure.












By having the flat structure illustrated in figure 2.7, any duplication of functions such as
human resource management, information technology and studio administration should
be eliminated whilst core functions should be merged. Similar operations should be
integrated as soon as possible and parallel operations should be avoided. The structures
should be adaptive to the dynamic environment in which they operate in order to remain
relevant.
In the next section, the organisational structure issues discussed above will be linked to
the organisational culture issues discussed in an earlier section of this chapter.
2.4.2 Effects of Organisational Culture on Organisational Structures
Although organisational culture considers values and norms whilst organisational
structure emphases authority and rules compatibility of culture and structure is likely to
enhance organisational effectiveness. This section illustrates the effect of organisational
culture on organisational structures.
The Integration process models that was suggested by Haspeslagh and Farquhar in figure
2.8 would be linked modes of acculturation in Figure 2.6 and figure 2.5 in the section on
organisational culture to illustrate the effect oforganisational structures.










Source: (David and Singh, 1993)
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A preservation integration mode is required when the strategic independence need is low
and the organisational autonomy needed is high. This integration mode would suit a
separation mode of acculturation, as the strategic independence need is low. As
organisational autonomy need is high, the organisational structure is likely to be flexible
and self-regulating (organic).
According to Haspeslagh and Farquhar (1994), when the strategic independence and
organisational autonomy needed is high, the symbiotic integration mode is recommended
given the need for each party not only to co exist but to grow through mutual
independence. The integration mode ties up with the integration mode of acculturation, as
the degree of relatedness of businesses will be high. The merger of the Carroll
O'Donovan Hardy with Ogilvy and Mather falls in this category, as similar operations
will be merged in older to achieve economies of scale. Due to the intensity of the
integration mode, symbiotic integration requires an organic structure, with Type I
leadership and multicultural tolerance.
In an absorption mode, the acquiring company or dominant partner in a merger needs to
impose its vision, as WaVel1ng due to cultural sensitivity is likely to harm the integration
process. The integration mode suits an assimilation mode of acculturation, as it is likely
to have a mechanistic culture, Type IT leadership and unicultuarism. In the Ogilvy and
Mather merger, this could be applied successfully at Barkers where Barkers dominated in
the post merger phase. Due to the size and the structure of Barkers, control is perceived to
be more important than flexibility.
Haspeslagh and Farquhar do not have an integration mode for low inter dependence and
low autonomy as they excluded conglomerate type acquisitions based on value transfer
and not value creation in their study (Haspeslagh and Farquhar.1994). If they had, the
integration mode would probably be disjointed and the acculturation mode deculturation.
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Organisational structures pIOvide an opportunity to achieve the perceived merger benefits
of rectifying managerial ineffectiveness, achieving synergies due to cost cutting and
achieving economies of scale. Strategy, technology, people, size and structure of an
organisation . are the key elements in detennining an organisational structure.
Organisational structure should be compatible with the organisational culture and the
integration mode of the merged companies in oIder to be effective. A flat and integrative
organisational structure with higWy skilled, team oriented empowered employees would
enhance a sales and perfonnance culture particularly suited to the advertising industry.
Having established the essential elements of organisational structures in the post-merger
envimnment, change management is discussed in the next, as it is essential to the overall
success of transfonning the new organisation.
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2.5 Change Management
The objective of this section is to review and suggest a proactive and organised way of
approaching change management after a merger in order to make the new merged
company competitive and effective. This is considered important to the overall study as
in a 1994 Conference Board Survey, only about one-third of the 166 US and European
companies that responded reported success with change efforts (Wood, 1996).
Today's companies are replacing control, rigidity, predictability and caution with
flexibility, responsiveness, innovation and openness. In addition merging companies have
to cope with changes resulting from globalisation, deregulation, increased customer focus
and emphasis on quality, development of an entrepreneurial spirit, fewer organizational
layers, increased delegation and rapid technological advances.
2.5.1 Resistance to Change
According to Stoner and Wankel (1986) there are three major causes of resistance to
change and ways of limiting resistance to change.
1. Uncertainty about the causes and effect of change. At a personal level, employees
would want to know how the merger would affect them. Honest communication by
top management to staff right from the beginning of the merger process is essential to
build trust of the employees. Management should communicate the causes of the
merger and effects, both at organisational and personal level.
2. Unwillingness to give up existing benefits. As a basic rule, individuals do not want to
be worse off after a merger. Besides work and remuneration issues, salient issues
such as influence, status and prospects should be addressed in communication with
the employees. Normally, when employees are involved in the change process and
they are aware of the bigger picture, resistance is reduced.
3. Awareness of weaknesses in the change. Management should avoid the temptation of
a 'know it all' attitude. Valuable input can be obtained from employees, as some of
them might have been in similar situations before.
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2.5.2 Change Process Models
Having discussed the sources of resistance to change and ways of limiting resistance,.
Kurt Lewin and John Lawrie's models on change management will be discussed. These
models have been chosen because of their relevance to retail mergers, which suits the
Ogilvy and Mather merger in Zimbabwe.
Psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1947 developed a three step sequential model of the change
process. It involves 'unfreezing, changing and refreezing behaviour patterns (Stoner and
Wankel, 1986) as illustrated:
Source: (Stoner and Wankel, 1996







Unfreezing involves exposing the need for change at organisational and personal level
for all to see and accept.
Changing involves internalising new behaviour.
Refreezing involves reinforcing the new behaviour pattern.
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The model is useful in that it recommends a sequential approach to change management.
It is however limited in that it views change as a narrow behavioural issue. In an
advertising agency merger process, in addition to behavioural issues, the agencies have to
consider changing technology and accounting systems, design packages, organisational
structures and strategies. As a result, an agency should gear itself for ways of managing a
broader change process.
The other limitation of Lewin's model is that in today's highly dynamic environment
nothing can be frozen for very long. It is more valuable to encourage tolerant culture in
an organization as the advertising industry in a continuous state of flux.
Whilst Lewin emphasized behavioural pattern ID a change process, John Lawrie
emphasised productivity and morale.
Figure 2.1.0 illustrates the level of productivity and morale during a change process.


















Like Lewin's model, Lawries' model also has three stages: the pre change period, the
transition period and the post change period. Its significance however is the realization
that productivity and morale levels initially drop during the transition phase before they
rise to a new level. It is therefore important for managers to realize that pertormance
might initially drop during the change process. The challenge is therefore to ensure the
drop in performance is as low and as short lived as humanely possible. It is equally
important to sustain or better still improve the enhanced operating levels after a change
process.
The next section will deal with essential elements of a successful change process and
incorporate application of the models discussed in this section.
2.5.3 Essential Elements ofa Successful Change Process
Different situations call for different methods. There is no recipe for managing change,
however there are key elements, which will be discussed in this section. These are likely
to increase the success rate of a merger and make the new organisation competitive and
effective.
A recommended programme for executing a successful change process is:
1. Mobilise commitment to change through joint diagnosis of the business problems
Having agreed on the need to change service delivery channels to customers, as an
example, the following questions below could be asked:
• What are the strengths and weaknesses ofthe present systems?
• How can the present systems strengths be enhanced and the weakness reduced?
• What customer service delivery system do we want to have in order to have a long-
term competitive advantage?
• How will the change be initiated?
• Who will be involved?
• Do we have the resources for the change to be successful?
• How does the change affect the various stakeholders: customers, internal departments
and suppliers?
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• What is the timescale for the scale?
• Who is responsible and accountability for the change?
• How will the concerns of those affected be resolved?
• What are the short term and long term benefits of change?
The above questions are not exhaustive, but are an illustration that a broad-based analysis
of the problem is required.
2. Create a shared vision and common direction (Kotter, 1995)
The shared vision clarifies the target destination of an organisation during a change
process. A shared vision gives inherent strength to an organisation by having a bonding
effect. Without a shared vision the organisation's change process can easily disintegrate,
as projects can be confusing and incompatible.
3. Separate from the past
It is not easy to dismantle old paradigms and create an adaptive, innovative and future
oriented organisation. The organisation's culture and structure should enable the
organisation to break from the past. For example, an organisation cannot be adaptive and
innovative when it has an authoritarian culture and tall hierarchical organizational
structure. Everybody in the organisation should be convinced that the past is not an
alternative in order to avoid the danger of people going back to their comfort zones.
4. Create a sense ofurgency (Moss, 1993)
In order to jumpstart and maintain the momentum in a change process, a sense of urgency
should be created. Informing staff of the threat of factors like new competition, shrinking
margins, decreasing market share, flat earnings, a lack of revenue growth, or other
relevant indices of a declining competitive position (Kotter, 1995) Should leave them
convinced that business as usual is totally unacceptable.
5. Strong, supportive and committed top management (Cass, 1991)
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Top management ultimately guide, drive and inspire change. They must therefore be
fInn, unwavering, committed to the strategic vision of change and be willing to 'walk
their talk'. Throughout the change process top management should be visible, dynamic
and demanding in order to maintain the momentum of the change process. Members of
the top management team bent on derailing the change process should have their services
terminated.
6. Open, Honest, Communication (Wood, 1996)
This reduces resistance to change and enhances trust in the whole process. Management
meetings, executive steering committee meetings, and company publications should be
used to reinforce the importance of the change activities. People should be allowed to
express their views on the change process no matter how controversial, as hidden
resistance to change is more detrimental than open resistance.
Publishing success stories of the change process motivates employees to continue with
the change process.
John P. Kotter summarized communication well in his article when he wrote:
"Communication comes in both words and deeds, and the latter are more the most
powerful fonn. Nothing undermines change more than behaviour by important
individuals that is inconsistent with their words" (Kotter, 1995).
7. Develop 'enabling systems' (Moss, 1993)
An organisational integrative change steering committee, independent of the
organizational structure should drive the change process. Off site retreats for two or three
days help in establishing a shared assessment of the change process. Flat integrative
organisational structures discussed in an earlier section would help encourage teamwork
and coordination during the change process. Training programs and involvement of
change management consultants help in enriching the change process.
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8. Institutionalise change through formal policies, systems and structures (Beer,
Eisenstal and Spector, 1990)
The change steering committee facilitates the change process. It should not replace the
fonnal organisational structures. Once the change steering committee has made its
recommendations, policies, systems and structures change should be driven by top
managers who have the responsibility and accountability. Successful implementation of
change is the true test of the change process.
9. Monitor and adjust strategies in response to problems in the change process
implementation (Kotter, 1995)
The change process must not be open-ended. It should have a time table against which
the process is bench maIked. The impracticability of some changes is sometimes only
noted during implementation. It is therefore necessary to adjust strategies if change
recommendations are impractical or have negative consequences. In spite of all problems
it is fundamental that change momentum is maintained. Although changes can be made to
the process, it is important to keep focused on the vision. Organisations should make
changes they can assimilate.
10. Create enabling culture (Overholt, Kroeger and Prager, 1994)
The change process is successfully sustained if the organisation culture enables it. If
leaders use the culture component as a driver for change, they must directly address the
organisation's values, myths and beliefs. The changes must be compatible with culture.
For example customer delivery systems cannot be improved if the company does not
value customer focus and continuous improvement.
The essential elements of change process discussed are the most critical, but in no ways
exhaustive. The importance of each element also differs fonn situation to situation, but is
of value in an advertising agency merger scenario such as that at Ogilvy and Mather
Zimbabwe.
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The recommended programme for executing a successful change process, if
implemented, is likely to ensure that the drop performance and morale during the
transition phase is limited to a minimum and the new operating level is enhanced.
Change processes have a low success rate, as they are not managed in a proactive and
organized way. The major sources of resistance to change are uncertainty about the
causes and effect of change, unwillingness to give up existing benefits and awareness of
weakness in the change. The recommended methods of dealing with resistance to change
are education and communication, participation and involvement, facilitation and support
and negotiation and agreement.
Lewin's three-step sequential model of change process has limitations in today's highly
dynamic environment as nothing can be frozen for very long. John Lawrie's model shows
more realistically that performance during transition level initially drops before it rises to
a higher level.
The essential elements of a successful change process are to mobilize commitment to
change through joint diagnosis of business problems, create a shared vision and common
direction, separate from the past, create a sense of urgency, have strong supportive and
committed top management, have open and honest communication, develop enabling
systems, institutionalise change through formal policies, systems and structures, monitor
and adjust strategies in response to problems in the change management implementation
and to create an enabling culture.
Having seen the importance of leadership in developing an organizational culture
(Section 2.2), structuring organisations (Section 2.3) and managing the change process




In dealing with the theory on organisational culture, organisational structures and change
management the common theme for their success in a post merger phase was strong
leadership. Due to the importance of leadership in the whole merger process, a review of
leadership models will be carned out and suggestions made on the profile required to
succeed in different circumstances. Leadership is seen as core to this study as it is the
driver ofdiscussions in the previous three sections.
Leadership deals with the ability to influence behaviour, beliefs, feelings and
performance of followers in a formal organization (Wright 1996). The leadership
challenge after a merger in an organisation is to galvanise the various merged units into
an efficient super-performing organisation. Superior performance is achieved by having
strong management, sales, and performance based culture, an ambitious vision and
strategy, performance oriented compensation and, meaningful management information
systems.
2.6.1 Leadership Models
Over the years leadership models have evolved from traits, behavioural, contingency to
situational contingent behavioural styles. Studies on traits attempted to identify the
personality characteristics. These studies would distinguish leaders and followers~ and
effective and less effective leaders. Behavioural models focused on behavioural.
interaction between leader and follower. Contingency models challenged the traits and
behavioural models, which assumed that there exists one, best way to lead and pioneered
the concept that leadership styles depend on different situations. Behavioural contingency
models also make the assumption that effective leadership depends on the situation and
define effective leadership in terms ofbehavioural rather than (Jago, 1982).
2.6.2 Herseyand Blanchard's Situational Leadership Theory
The situational Leadership Theory seeks to establish the most effective mix of task and
relationship behaviour by a leader in relation to the maturity of the subonlinates. Maturity
is defined as the ability and willingness of people to take responsibility for their own
behaviour (VVright 1996)
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Figure 2.1.1 illustrates the Hersey and Blanchard's situationalleadership theory
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Hersey and Blanchard describe four leadership styles:
• Telling. This style is relevant where tasks are homogenous and voluminous and staff
skills level relatively lower.
• Selling. Suitable for a business with a high need for direction but input of subordinate is
valuable as they have a high contact rate with customers.
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• Participating. This style is suited to an environment where the follower organisation is
much closer to the customer the market leader.
• Delegating. This style of leadership is applicable to businesses with a very high skill
level of the employees.
As can be seen in Figure 2.1.1, SI, matches Ml, S2 matches M2 etc. Organisational
effectiveness is enhanced when leadership style matches follower maturity.
The simplicity of the Situational Leadership Theory makes it useful as a starting point in
predicting which Leadership style is required for employees with a particular maturity.
The situational leadership theory looks good in a static environment. However as the
modem business environment is very dynamic, there is bound to be unpredictable
overlaps from time to time in the style of the leader and the maturity of the follower, for
example, in a period of high turbulence a leader who would normally adopt a delegating
management style might suddenly be telling. If however, the follower remains able and
willing, this is likely to cause conflict and lower leadership effectiveness.
Rather than react to situations, transformational leaders do not necessarily react to the
environmental circumstances - they create them, as it will be discussed in the following
section.
2.6.3 Models of Transactional and Transformational Leadership by Avolio and
Bass
After a merger, in on:ler to achieve synergy benefits the combined companies need to
operate at a level higher than expected in on:ler to maximize the benefits of a merger.
This requires more than a transactional leader, who will help subordinates achieve
objectives; it requires a transformational leader who will inspire the subon:linates to
perform beyond expectations.
As illustrated in figure 2.1.2 transactional leaders influence the behaviour of their
followers by exchanging one thing for another (contingent rewan:l); for example
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promotion for meeting performance requirements. The transforming leader seeks instead
to satisfy higher needs and engages the full person and the followers. The leader and the
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Figure 2.1.2 Avolio and Bass's model of transactional
and transformational leadership
Figure 2.1.2 demonstrates that transformational leadership is complementary to
transactional leadership rather than supplementary. Transformational leadership builds on
the sound foundation of transactional leadership in order to elevate subordinates from
security and safety to a new of self-esteem and self-actualisation according to Maslow's
Hierarchy of needs
According to Bass (1990) in an extensive survey of over 1500 managers' subordinates
who describe their leaders as being more transformational are more likely to say their
organisations are highly effective. In contrast Peter Wright suggests that this research
suffered a number of methodical and conceptual weakness, which undoubtedly
exaggerated the effectiveness of transformational leadership (Wright 1996). The
criticisms are due to one-dirnensional research, as only sub ordinates were questioned in
the Multi Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) and the scale used had a bias in favour of
transformational leadership.
Whatever the criticisms to Avolio and Bass, they certainly added a new dimension to the
study of leadership, contributed to the re emergence of charismatic and trait approaches
to leadership and prepared fertile ground for broader and balanced further studies into the
relationship between transformational leadership and effective organizations.
Leadership is a core driver in the organization's ability to manage culture, change and
opportunity cohesively and move towards the organisation's strategic vision. Matching of
leadership style and maturity of followers according to the Hersey and Blanchard's
situational leadership theory enables followers to perform beyond expectations.
Management adaptability is required in managing organizations post merger. Different
situations require different leadership styles. However, the common elements of the




In recent years, many organisations have looked at mergers and acquisitions as
alternative means to growth. There has been an increase in the world of these mergers
prompted by a variety of conditions that have become available in today's global
business environment. Many mergers however, have been doomed to fail from the onset
because organisations neglect to foster a constructive way forward once the merger has
been legally concluded. Researchers have identified key strategic issues that need to be
focused upon in order to ensure success post merger. For effective post merger
management, the following strategic conditions must be present:
• An enabling culture to facilitate the integration of the merging companies
• A well suited structure that has no room for redundant reporting practices
• A fonnidable change management strategy to ease employees and customers into the
''new'' way ofdoing things with minimum disruptions to business operation.
• An inspiring leadership to steer the company through the difficulties that
organisational culture, structure and change management may pose to a newly
merged organisation.
The next chapter will be a case study of the three agencies: Carroll O'Donovan Hardy,
Barlcer MacCorrnack Ogilvy and Mather and CM & A The chapter will outline
conditions at the agencies before the merger and immediately after the merger was
concluded in September 2001.
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CHAPTER 3
<:;ASE STUDY OF THE ADVERTISING AGENCIES
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will narrate the following aspects about each of the agencies ofCarroll
O'Donovan Hardy, CM & A and Barker MacConnack Ogilvy and Mather.
• Organisational Culture - Detail the prevailing culture at the agency before the merger
and outline any changes that the merger brought to the organisational culture in place
at CM & A and at Barkers (with the conclusion of the merger, Carroll O'Donovan
Hardy ceased to exist).
• Organisational Structure - Outline the organisational structures that were in place pre
merger and indicate how this changed if at all after the merger.
• Change Management - Focus on the strategies adopted by management from the
inception of the merger talks and relate how the merger and its implications were
announced to groups and individuals within the three agencies.
• Leadership - An outlook on the varying leadership styles of management at the three
agencies and a demonstration of management's response to the merger.
Sticking close to the literature in Chapter 2, the four areas have been selected because of
the crucial role they play in the success or failure of any merger or acquisition. This
chapter is important in that it fOllllS the basis for the next chapter which will evaluate at
length the effectiveness of these areas in tenns of the post merger strategies that were put
in place at CM & A and Barker MacConnack.
3.2 Carron O'Donovan Hardy
The youngest of the three agencies, Carroll O'Donovan Hardy or as its employees
affectionately called it CO'DH was established in 1991. Its founding members were
John Carroll, Anthony Hardy and Styx O'Donovan. Carroll sold his shares equally to
the remaining two shareholders in 1995. Hardy and O'Donovan became 50:50 owners
of the agency. The agency often prided itself as being innovative and used the youth
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of its shareholders (late thirties) and its equally young staff (average age was 27) as
one of its key selling points. The agency's first and probably most loyal client was
Stanbic Bank8• The bank's South African ties led CO'DH to pursue and eventually
obtain an affiliation with TBWA. Standard Bank in South African was handled by
one of the leading TBWA agencies in the world, Hunt Lascaris. The TBWA
affiliation would prove very unsuccessful for CO'DH in the years to come as the
related synergies that are the reasons agencies pursue international affiliations were
greatly reduced in Zimbabwe. This was largely because the only other TBWA
associated companies that are in Zimbabwe were:
• Edgars. The clothing retailer in this country had an established in house advertising
department and as such felt they had no use for a local advertising agency.
• Nandos. In this country the food chain franchise is run by a group that has dominated
the market almost beyond competition. The chain carries out very little advertising
with a local flavour. Any materials used in store are largely sourced directly from
South Africa. Again, this company feels they have little or no use for the services of
an advertising agency.
• SPAR. While the supermarket chain cames out extensive advertising, CO'DH
delIberately never pursued them as a client. This was because the agency's largest
client by far (MAKRO) saw them as a direct rival in their grocery line ofbusiness and
would consider a serious conflict of interest if SPAR was in the same advertising
stable as them.
All was not lost however, because of the fiuitless affiliation. In the years following its
formation, the agency managed to acquire in its own rights, a client base that would
prove profitable for the co owners in the short fUll.
3.2.1 Organisational Culture
The atmosphere at CO'DH was extremely informal. Everyone was on a first name
basis. There was camaraderie amongst staff that did not discriminate on the basis of
position or rank. Pub nights were held every Wednesdays and Fridays. All were
8 A member of Standard Bank of South Africa.
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welcome, from the messengers through to the Managing Director. It was a known fact
that at interviews for prospective new employees that were attended by the Managing
Director, the question ''Do you drink?" would be posed. If the answer was no, the
person would be asked if they had strong moral objections to alcohol. If the answer
was yes, that person quite clearly would never fit into the way of things at Carroll
O'Donovan Hardy and would not be offered the job! When it came to recruitment of
personnel, the shareholders focused on the hiring of personality types that would fit in
with the agency's culture. The skills that the individuals possessed were only
considered once they were satisfied that they had the right candidate socially. It was
management's belief that much of the drive to succeed career wise was born from the
placing of individuals of similar social preferences so that their work literally became
an extension of their pleasure time, and from that they felt they could derive more
productivity from their workforce.
Decision making within the agency was carried out by individuals close to the task or
problem. The Managing Director believed in empowering staff so as to save valuable
time when members were confronted with problems and clients or suppliers were
demanding immediate solutions. The agency also had a very open door policy. The
Managing Director also made it a point to walk through to everyone's office
including the kitchen for a chat on social and business matters everyday.
3.2.2 Organisational Structure
CO'DH was characterised by a top-heavy organisational structure. The agency had




• Client Services Director
• Production Director
• New Business Director
• Media Director
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The last three listed directors had no subonlinates in their respective departments. All
the board members reported directly to the Managing Director. Below the levels of
director, there were no managerial positions per se. The Client services department
was made up of three account executives. The Creative Department - the hub of any
advertising agency comprised a traffic controller», a copywriter, and several artists or
art directors, as they are known in the industry. The Finance department had three
account clerks.
3.2.3 Change Management
As soon as the merger talks had reached a mature stage, an announcement was made
to staff of the proposed way forwanl. Any fears of redundancy were allayed as it was
pointed out that the merger would not see any "casualties". Since, Carroll O'Donovan
Hanly had a weaker affiliation, it was made known from the beginning that the
agency would effectively cease to exist and that the staff would be divided between
BMOM and CM & A as management of all the three agencies saw fit. At the time of
the announcement, however it was not made public knowledge who would go to
which agency and why. This information would only be revealed two weeks before
the literal physical transition. The two shareholders, focused on the benefits of the
merger at the time of the announcement, pointing out that the declining economic
conditions in the country made it difficult for an agency the size of CO'DH to
continue operating profitably. The merger on the other hand, offered CO'DH the
potential of a bigger market share and an increased scope for growth to the
individuals. The only downside to the merger that was 'noted by the shareholders
would be the resultant break up of the CO'DH family as members went to separate
agency that had little or no interaction beyond the boardroom level.
3.2.4 Leadership
The leadership style at Carroll O'Donovan was a cross between the two extremes of
the shareholders, The Managing Director had a very participating type of leadership
9
The person who controls the flow of work within an advertising agency.
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where he often consulted all his subordinates before making any decisions. The
Creative director on the hand made decisions concerning his department unilaterally
and his decisions where not subject to any debate from his subordinates.
3.3CM&A
The smaller of the Ogilvy and Mather agencies, CM & A came into existence when
management at BaIker McCormack was offered the opportunity to handle the Old
Mutual business, through the Ogilvy and Mather Network. Barker McCormack was
already servicing Southampton Life Assurance (then owned by SANLAM). The
exclusivity rule that governed all agencies in Zimbabwe could not allow Barkers to
take on Old Mutual in the same stable as Southampton. Both companies had huge
potential in terms of billings and it would have been foolish for management at
BaIkers to pass up one in favour of the other. A decision was made to form an
independent agency and a holding company that would be responsible for BaIkers
and the new agency that was named CM & A. Hence the birth of the Ogilvy and
Mather Group in Zimbabwe. CM & A was initially staffed by four employees who
had originally been at BaIker McCormack. Two of them were appointed to the
position of Chairman and Media Director (the latter would later become Vice
Chairman). A third member of the board was brought in to become the Managing
Director.
The major challenge for the agency from the onset was to carve a life beyond Old
Mutual and seek other clients. It had been agreed that the two 0 & M agencies would
not compete on pitcheslO, rather, they would decide before hand which agency was
better suited to serve the prospective client and then that agency would pitch for the
account. This was done so that the group's chances of winning new accounts would
not be eroded. CM& A made a conscious decision to pursue only the blue chip
companies. Over the years, the agency built a small but very sound client base,
comprising BATA, PELHAMS, MOBIL, Kimberley ClaIke, Levers and TELONE.




CM & A had a laissez faire attitude towards its internal day-to-day function. The
agency was made up of a celtain breed of "worker-a-holics" who often worked all
night and came into the agency later the following morning rather than at the regular
starting hours. The place was originally a hive of activity. The agency had no
Creative Director. This was very unusual for an agency. The creative work was
derived from the regular brain storming sessions that were held at the agency. These
sessions involved every member of staff including messengers and the tea maker
whose input was also valued. Over time, this enthusiasm to wolk seemed to die down.
With no one to steer the creative side of the agency, it became difficult for the client
services department to maintain the momentum that their clients had become
accustomed to. Clearly the agency needed a Creative head, but in a country like
Zimbabwe, finding a Creative Director with the right qualifications to suit an 0 & M
agency was not easy and the agency had failed to do so for over two years.
Decision making at CM & A was left exclusively to the directors who then
communicated their decisions to the employees. The Chairman and the vice-chairman
had a very approachable outlook on the business and would look at ways of
increasing revenue by being proactive with the existing client base. The Managing
Director by contrast, believed that increased revenue could only be achieved through
a severe charge out system where as much was invoiced out to clients as was possible
without getting them to query the charging system. Since the Managing Director held
the belief that the best place for a higher turnover was from within, he was not too
aggressive on the new business front. CM & A tended to be very selective about the
type of business they pursued. The agency almost never attended any pitches and
relied on social contacts through the 0 & M netwolk to lead them directly to new
clients.
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When the seven members of CO'DH moved in to CM & A in October 2001, the
prevailing organisational culture at CM & A continued in practise for a few months.
The seven were treated as any other new employees to the agency would have been
and expected to fit in with the way of things at the agency. The Managing Director
made a point of telling each individual to learn the CM & A way of doing things and
follow it as closely as possible to make life easier for everyone. In the months to
come, however, the tension created by the merging of two different work cultures
eased, as staffbecame more open minded and willing to understand each other's work
ethics. The addition of two new board members, including the shareholding Creative
Director from CO'DH was also instrumental in the immediate overhaul of the
decision making process at CM & A. A reporting system to the departmental heads
who in turn would report to the relevant director was now encouraged.
3.3.2 Organisational Structure
Pre merger, CM & A had a Chairman, Vice Chairman and a Managing Director at the
Board level. Below that level, there was middle management that comprised the
media manager, studio manager, production manager, finance manager and two
account managers. There was no clearly defined reporting structure. Employees
reported to whichever of the three directors they felt comfortable with. On issues
affecting the entire agency, the Vice -chairman became the employees' director of
choice. They would present their queries or grievances to her and she would then
advise the other two directors, and together they made the overall decision.
The managers were in charge of their own departments. The account managers had no
subordinates but controlled the studio/artists whenever they had jobs in progress. The
account managers also ran the client accounts together with one of the three directors.
The production and media managers had one assistant each. The Finance manager ran
a department of three account clerks. The studio was basically autonomous in a sense
but its staff fell under the account manager responsible for whatever job that they
were working on at any given time.
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After the merger, the structure at CM & A changed with the addition of two new
board members who came from Carroll O'Donovan Hardy. The positions that they
took up in the merged company were that of Creative and Finance Directors. An
Account Executive,11 who was renamed an account manager, a finance clerk, a
copywriter and five artists, also joined the CM & A team. With the upheaval that
surrounded the initial phases ofthe merger, the Vice-Chairman, the Finance manager,
media manager and the studio manager (all from the original agency) handed in their
resignations. The position of vice chainnan was never filled. The other three were
filled internally from within the organisation.
3.3.3 Change Management
Any details of the merger were kept at the boardroom level, until well after the deal
was signed. The announcement, when it was eventually made was kept short and to
the point, and there was very little opportunity for the staff to ask questions regarding
the new set up. They were basically told that no one would lose their job and that they
had to do- their best to make the merger wolk. Management showed no passion or
emotion for the decision to merge and made it clear that it was a Group decision that
as employees of CM & A they had little control over. The onus was however on them
to ensure that the transition took place swiftly with minimum disruptions.
Immediately following the physical transition to CM & A the Managing Director
addressed the CO'DH members in his welcome to them. He informed them that the
agency's they now belonged to differed greatly from CO'DH, stating that the
emphasis at CM & A was on individual worlc performance. There was no room at the
agency for team effOlts because everyone had their set tasks and should work hard to
accomplish them individually. Otherwise, he encouraged the new members of staff to
do their best to blend in at CM & A and to feel at home.
11 Sometimes referred to as AE. Account Manager, Account Director and Account Executive refer
to the same job descrption but are referred to differently from agency to agency.
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3.3.4 Leadership
The Chairman and the vice chairman believed in leading by example. They adopted a
parental type of guidance for their employees. The members of staff knew that they
could discuss any issues with them, personal or otherwise, and obtain sound advice.
The Managing Director on the other hand was less approachable by nature and
believed that everyone should be treated as an adult and left to conduct their duties
with little or no supervision.
The Creative Director's arrival at CM & A meant that the creative department now
had a mentor. All members of the creative team were now to report directly to him.
The Creative Director also preferred to be the one to brief his subordinates on all jobs.
He thus discouraged direct communication between client services and the artists,
demanding that they direct all requests to the creative department through him.
Members of Client services from CM & A found this exceptionally difficult because
they had controlled the creative for two years, and now, suddenly they could not even
liase directly with the artists.
3.4 Barker McCormack Ogilvy and Mather
Barkers12 as it is popularly known is one of the oldest and most established advertising
agencies in the country. Established in the seventies, Barkers was by far the largest
agency in Zimbabwe in terms of Billings. The agency's creativity was well renowned,
not least for one of the country's greatest crazes - the OK Grand Challenge Horse Racing
day. The race day was an idea that the agency had given its retail chain client OK as a
way to boost flagging sales. The event succeeded in getting bigger and bigger each year.
As the economic downturn hit the country the Grand Challenge has became a source of
hope for people to own a car, a house or a year's worth ofgrocery supplies.
The staff turnover at Barkers over the years has been very low. This was very unusual for
an industry where resignations are the norm as people move between agencies. The
agency could boast of employing some ofthe longest serving individuals in the industry.
12 Also referred to in this dissertation as BMOM.
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The systems at the agency were established and peIfected through years of trial and error.
Over the years, the agency thrived from a mix of cross sectional clients from every
industry big and small. No client was unattainable for the Barkers team. Presentation for
new business and cold calls were common ways that the agency expanded its business.
3.4.1 Organisational Culture
The prevailing culture at Barkers was more fonnal than at the average advertising
agency. Senior members of staff were addressed by their courtesy title and last name.
Members of the board were revered and they did not mix socially with the lower ranking
members of staff. The agency had a separate dining room were the directors had their
lunches. Barkers employed 32 members of staff, which by comparison to the other
agencies was quite large. The work culture at the agency saw individuals divided into
strategic teams that worked exclusively on certain types of clients. For example, there
was a retail team that comprised an account director, art director, a copywriter and an
artist. These teams carved their own individual work codes depending on their
preferences and were empowered to make decisions regarding their work on the spot
without further consultation with management. The teams, five in total, had very little
interaction with each other.
3.4.2 Organisational Structure




• Client Services Director
• Creative Director.
The Managing Director saw to the day-to-day running ofthe agency. All the various
teams and departments reported directly to him. The finance director had team of a
fmance manager and four clerks. The client services director was responsible for the four
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account directors with whom he liaised closely on the peIfonnance of the agency's
clients. The creative department comprised four copywriters and six artists who reported
directly to the Creative Director.
In December 2001, the CO'DH Managing Director joined the BMOM board as a Director
with no portfolio and continued to wolk as an Account Director on the various accounts
that he had from CO'DH. The New Business Director and the Traffic Manager were
reassigned duties as Account Executives and referred to as such. The Media Director
joined the media department and was not assigned a title but was to report directly to the
BMOM Media Manager.
3.4.3 Change Management
BaIkers' management notified its staff about the ensuing merger at the same time as the
announcement was made to CM & A employees. Since the numbers coming in to join
BaIkers from CO'DH were considered negligible to have any overall impact on the order
of things, the merger was viewed more like a take over bid ofCO'DH by the much
stronger.Barker McConnack. The group's chairman made the announcement and stressed
that the merger had been undertaken to maintain Ogilvy and Mather's dominance of the
Zimbabwean advertising industry. In his address, he encouraged the new members of
BaIkers to adjust to their new environment and urged them to approach him directly if
they were experiencing any problems.
3.4.4 Leadership
The agency's executive chaitman had a very hands on approach to the business and
literally ran BMOM. A natural leader, the chairman was able to convince his clients to
completely trust their agency by allowing the agency free reign to develop their brands in
a manner that would obtain maximum benefits. He believed in the Ogilvy and Mather13
philosophy of making your clients your closest friends not just business allies. This belief
is based on the fact that it makes it harder for clients who consider you a friend to defect
13 Also referred to in this dissertation as 0 & M.
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to other agencies without a genuine reason. Through this, BMOM was able to keep a
stable clientele for many years.
The chairman embraced all the formality that characterised Barkers. An elderly man, in
his seventies and clad in a suit every day, he made a mockery of the industry's reference
of the term suit as he took it literally. 14 He believed in the tried and tested and like many
from his generation, did not embrace change very well as it threatened the familiar and
did not necessarily translate to better. He believed in the old adage of the old broom
knowing all the corners, as such he did not encourage any deeper integration of the
merger than the physical move of the CO'DH staff members to BMOM. To him it was
fairly simple that the new corners would eventually get the hang ofthings at BMOM.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the differences in organisational culture,
organisational StIUcture, change management strategies and leadership styles
within the three agencies. Left unmanaged, these differences could clearly
threaten the viability of the merger ahead. The cautious approach of BMOM, the
laissez faire attitude at CM & A and the carefree and lax style of CO'DH, each
with its own merits and disadvantages, offered their members a familiarity they
would not be too willing to let go of.
The next chapter will evaluate the impact of these differences on the merger and
assess the extent to which management recognised these differences and tried to
wode around them for the benefit of the merger
14 "The suits" in the advertising industry refers to the client services department and those that
regularly interface with clients. It is a tongue and cheek expression because very seldom do
Agency employees dress formally and even less so in suites. However this group dress more
formally by comparison hence the expression.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION OF THE MERGER
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will analyse in detail the actual merger of Carroll O'Donovan Hardy and
Ogilvy and Mather Zimbabwe. Particular attention will be paid to the merging of the two
companies at the various levels that took place. These were:
• CO'DH and CM & A and
• CO'DH and BMOM.
In this analysis, the current practises at the agencies and within the Group will be
reviewed against the literature presented in Chapter 2. A brief mention of the current
economic conditions in Zimbabwe will be included in this chapter because the impact of
this on the advertising industry in general and on 0 & M in particular is profound. An
evaluation of the merger will then be presented in view of how effectively the group is
managing the merger according to the prescribed literature. The evaluation will be canied
out in sections as per the literature review, which cover organisational culture,
organisational structure, change management and leadership. A summary will then
conclude this chapter and briefly outline the fin~ chapter of this dissertation.
4.2 Research Methodology
The research began with the case study of the companies that is presented in chapter 3 of
this dissertation. The case study is of value to the research in that it exposes the
differences in organisational culture, organisational structure, change management and
leadership at the three agencies before the merger and immediately after the physical
transition that saw staff from CO'DH move to CM & A and BMOM.
A four-part questionnaire was distributed to everyone that was employed at the three
agencies at the time of the conclusion of the merger in September 2001. A questionnaire
was chosen as the data collection method for the following reasons:
• It allowed for contact with all the respondents.
• It guaranteed anonymity and ensured the responses would be more honest than was
otherwise possible with other techniques.
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• Allowed respondents time to think over the questions and to seek the researcher's
assistance where they required it.
• It was cost effective as the questionnaire was emailed between the researcher and the
respondents.
The choice of a questionnaire also came with related problems. These were:
• The generic design meant that some members of staff did not fully understand some
of the sections and what they where trying to achieve. This meant that the researcher
spend considerable amounts of time on the phone or in person trying to clarify the
sections and possibly simplifying the questions in oIder to achieve a response from
some of the respondents.
• The detail in the answers had to be limited mostly to a selection of responses that
were previously considered to cover all possible responses. At times, respondents felt
that more than one answer described their personal circumstances.
• In order to get the high response rate of 92.3%, the researcher made daily follow up
phone calls and chats to, and weekly emails with the respondents to clarify any issues
that they may not have fully understood and to reinind them to complete the exercise.
• Some respondents were not convinced that their particular responses would be
safeguarded by the anonymity the researcher promised and had to be practically
begged to participate in the survey.
4.2.1 Target Population and Sample
For the purposes of this study, the target population was defined as all persons
that were employed at any of the three advertising agencies at the time that the
merger was concluded in September 2001. This included respondents who were
no longer employed by Ogilvy and Mather Zimbabwe.
In total, 65 questionnaires were distributed in September/ October 2002. The
questionnaires were not given to the shareholding directors of the company
because of an anticipated bias in the answers that they were likely to provide. Of
the total number of questionnaires, 60 questionnaires were returned yielding a
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response rate of 92.3%. Of the 5 questionnaires that were not retumed, 4 were
from members originally from Barkers that were still employed. The remainder
was from a former CO'DH member who left the country with no contact address.
4.2.2 Questionnaire Design
The structure of the questionnaire was such that it was divided up into subsections
to assess the respondents' reactions towards the merger in tenns of:
• Change Management. In this section the respondents were required to select
their answers on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being the least favourable.
• Culture. Here, the respondents were asked to do the exercise twice. Firstly
answering for the pre merger agency that they worked for and secondly, for
the post merger agency that they were employed.
• Leadership. This section was made up of 10 questions with a selection of
answers ranging from a choice of 2 to a choice of 4 as was deemed necessary
for the research.
The first 'page of the questionnaire contained questions about general information
for the researcher's overall administrative purposes. Areas covered here included
the agency that one worked for prior to the merger and the number of years that
they had been employed by the agency. It went on to assess if the respondent was
still employed by the group and if not asked for the reason for their departure. For
those still with the group, the question "Do you enjoy your job/environment after
the merger?" was asked.
4.3 Review of the Merger and the Zimbabwean Economic Environment
4.3.1 Driving Forces for the Merger
Various factors lead the shareholders of Carroll O'Donovan Hardy TBWA and
Ogilvy and Mather Zimbabwe to embark on merger talks in July 2000. Each
group came to the table with its own particular thoughts on the benefits that they
hoped to derive from the move. The overall driving force that influenced these






Increase shareholder value. For the two shareholders of CO'DH, pooling their
resources into the larger 0 & M group meant increased wealth potential. For
O&M shareholders, the capacity of CO'DH clients was not overlooked.
Having that agency's cash cows within the 0 & M stable meant an instant
increase revenue which in turn would improve the individual members'
shareholding.
Increased market share. Undoubtedly the group would be the home of the
industries two largest agencies.
Administratively, the group could then better achieve economies of scale
through the proposed cost cutting measures that would evolve from the
planned co-oniinated effort of group activities.
The merger talks were also driven by the particular benefits that each group felt
they could derive from the move. For each, these driving forces were as follows:
• Carron O'Donovan Hardy
• The abdication of the responsibility the two shareholders felt they owed
their employees. The economic future in the Zimbabwean environment
had become very uncertain for CO'DH. The possibility of downsizing and
even closure was a serious threat that could easily become reality if the
performance of the agency's clients did not improve. At the time of the
merger CO'DH found itself in the unenviable position of relying on one
client for 65% of its turnover. The client- Makro was also showing signs
of curtailing their ad spend in view of the harsh economic climate - a
move that would have a profound impact on the agency. In the merged
agency, the CO'DH shareholders would not worry about what became of
their "family" as they would have become the responsibility of the less
personally involved Ogilvy & Mather board.
• Similarly, if CO'DH was to stand any chance of weathering the storms of
the economic climate, they needed a formidable strength to go against the
odds in onler to grow to meet the challenges. The agency needed an
affiliation that would work to guarantee them global brands even in times
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of economic adversity. The TBWA link would never offer CO'DH this
lifeline.
• Through the merger, the CO'DH shareholders could control and reduce
certain operating costs for their clients as they could now source for
products and services from the various essential service providing
companies that 0 & M had a stake in. For example, the group owned 50%
of the shares respectively in the country's most reputable research
company and signage company. 0 & M also have reduced shareholding in
one of the largest audio and visual production houses in Zimbabwe.
• A selfish, though very possible reason for engaging in merger talks would
be the chance for the two shareholders to grow professionally within an
aggressive advertising group which looked to all its units world wide for
promotion.
• Ogilvy and Mather Zimbabwe
• The merger presented 0 & M with an opportunity to minimise the
competition that the group was facing in the country.
• Carroll O'Donovan Hardy was cash rich. 0 & M on the other hand had
minimal cash reserves. Merging with CO'DH would improve the group's
cashflow.
• 0 & M would secure the rare skills of a Creative Director for CM & A.
The agency had surprisingly canied on functioning without a creative
head for over two years.
• Finally, the merger would create the largest advertising concern ill
Zimbabwe in tenns ofbillings.
At the time of wIiting, the merger was well into its ninth month of operation.
Having been concluded in September 2001, the closure of Carmll O'Donovan
Hardy was staggered over three months. It had been anticipated that the agency
would close down on September 302001 and that its staff would move to CM &
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A and BMOM to resume business on October 12001. Only the move to CM & A
matelialised on schedule. The move to BMOM would only follow two months
later because the administration at Barkers felt that they needed the extra time to
plan the physical positioning of the new members of staff. This created tension
and anxiety among those that remained at CO'DH as they did not know who they
woIked for - CO'DH which no longer existed or BMOM which was not ready to
welcome them? Worse still, the clients they continued to service from the CO'DH
premises became confused and at times annoyed because in earnest, CO'DH had
ceased to exist as a legal entity.
At the time the merger talks were nearing their conclusion, the two shareholders
of CO'DH had met each and every one of their clients to infonn them of the
merger and to request that the clients continued to support them. The clients, were
actually told that as far as the day to day running of their accounts was concerned,
the only change they would have to grapple with was the new name on the
lettemead of the invoice that they would now receive at the end of each month.
All of the agency's clients assured the shareholders of their continued support in
the new venture. After all they would be receiving the same service levels that
had attracted then to the agency in the first instance and deal with the same team
as before? As this chapter progresses however, it will become clear that with the
rapid departure of these familiar personnel, fonner CO'DH clients began to feel
compromised.
Once settled into their new agencies, CO'DH members had the insunnountable
task of making their clients feel comfortable with the new set up and to keep the
promise made of continued excellent service levels. This would however prove to
be particularly difficult, as the powers that be at CM & A and BMOM made no
effort whatsoever to meet their new clients. To illustrate this point, at CM & A,
CO'DH's fonner number 3 Client's managing director personally requested an
invitation on a subsequent Friday afternoon to see the new premises and meet the
new management. The Account Executive (AE) and the Creative Director (a
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former CO'DH Shareholder) who jointly handled the account informed all
relevant parties at CM & A about the afternoon. On the day of the function, the
Chairman, Managing Director and the Vice-Chairman (all originally of CM & A)
apologised that they had all overlooked some personal commitments and as such
were not free to attend! The client arrived to the welcome of the same familiar
faces that she knew from CO'DH and to suffer their insincere explanation as to
why the new agency's management was unavailable that day.
For both agencies, the integration of the staff was never well co-ordinated. There
was no welcoming party to ease the transition for both parties. Instead, the new
employees were addressed upon their arrival, and without the presence of the
agency's original members, by the Chairman at Barkers and the Managing
Director at CM & A. Once at their new agencies, the CO'DH members were left
alone to find their way around the new system of doing things. At BMOM, the
original members of staff went about their business with little change if at all as
CO'DH was going to fit into their way of doing things and not vice versa or any
other way. At CM & A, however, the presence of the new shareholding creative
director and a finance director meant that certain departments were now under
new governance. With no effort made at integration at this stage, some original
members of the CM & A staff began to feel uncomfortable and threatened in their
job environment.
The oversight of human integration by the authors of the CO'DH - O&M merger,
was to come at a severe cost for individuals, the two agencies and in turn the
group. At CM & A, the account executive from CO'DH, struggled to keep her
clients happy as she single handedly had to perform all functions that she had
previously relied upon an entire agency's participation. The Vice-Chairman who
held the portfolio of head of client services never conversed more with the AE
than the offer or return of perfunctory greetings! After her departure two months
later, the Chairman and Managing Director, did little more, albeit a quarterly
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report at the end of that year to highlight that 3 of the fOlmer CO'DH clients
ranked in the combined agency's top 5 clients in terms of billings and production.
After the departure of the vice chairman, the tension at CM & A between the two
groups of employees eased considerably and greater strides were made in terms of
combining the two agencies into a new one that embraced the values of both
parties. This effort took place naturally and almost without intention, possible
because the 7 CO'DH members were evenly distributed between the departments
and in 5 of those instances, were the people in charge of that particular
department. As their CM & A subordinates gained their trust and respect, so
came a new unity between the two agencies. Since this co-operation did not come
from any seriously co-ordinated effort, it would remain very fragile in its
operation. The work conduct of the two agencies differed so greatly that failure to
recognise this at management level eventually lead to the departure of the CO'DH
AE. Long used to a team way of doing things, the laissez faire system in place at
CM & A eventually became intolerable for her. Citing management's lack of
interest in her portfolio she tendered her resignation but offered to stay long
enough for the agency to find a suitable replacement for her. - The agency's
Managing Director and Chairman had still not considered it important to meet 4
of her 5 accounts' personnel.
With her resignation, management at CM & A woke up to the fact that the merger
had not been handled professionally. In recognition of their faults, the Managing
Director and the Chairman joined the Creative Director to officially meet the
CO'DH clients 8 months into the merger. Further, they accepted that it was best
for the AE in spite of her pending resignation, to liase with the Creative Director
to bring in a successor that would ensure some continuity for these clients. A
previous director who had left CO'DH before the merger to pursue his own
company was called in to rejoin the new team and service the clients by offering
them a familiar face who understood their business. Though the AE and the
former director spent six weeks together it was a move that was however too little
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too late to assure the CO'DH clients of some continuation once the AE left. The
CM & A executives meeting of the clients so late in the merger did not go
unquestioned by the former CODH clients. Many would quite rightly complain
that at the subsequent Christmas party that was held, their presence was not even
recognised by the Chainnan and the Managing Director who clearly did not
remember their clients from their only meeting a few weeks ago. With the clients
egos dented, and the departure of their 5 year long account executive, the writing
was clearly on the wall. By the end of 2002, with the departure of the AE15, all
but one ofthe 5 clients had submitted their accounts to a pitch16•
The situation at Barkers was little different for the CO'DH employees.
Management had, without considering the consequences, assumed that the 14
CO'DH employees would just fit into the BMOM way of doing things. The new
order of things was for the CO'DH members extremely different. With the
differences varying from slight to extreme. The result was ever increasing
discontent at the whole merger process for the CO'DH members. The cultural
changes they faced at Barkers were more difficult than those faced by their fonner
colleagues at CM & A. High on the list of the unsettling changes was the
segregation that was so alien to them. Such norms at BMOM as a toilet for
Directors only and a dining hall for certain members of staff created an unsettling
atmosphere for the new corners. At the staff canteen, on the first day, the
employees had to go without lunch, as there were no plates to dish out their
meals. The former CO'DH Managing Director had to bring 14 plates for everyone
the next day, in a futile attempt to rescue the situation.
BMOM was by any standards very formal for an advertising agency. Those in
management were referred to by title and last name. While acceptable at Barkers,
it made the CO'DH members uncomfortable because at CO'DH, the managing
15 The Account Executive left the country on leaving the agency, thus did not poach clients as is
industry practise to another agency_
16 The tendering of the company's advertising portfolio to 2 or more agencies to select the one
most suitable to run that account.
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director was referred to by his nickname by every member of staff. It also created
an unbridgeable distance between management and the remainder of the staff as it
created an ''us'' and "them" scenario. The CO'DH Managing Director tried to
lessen the impact of this problem by insisting that everyone continued to refer to
him by his nick name as he was so used to, though this move did little to lighten
the situation. To the average BMOM employee, the 14 new members of staff
were an inconvenience that at best had to be tolerated and at worst, forced to leave
as soon as possible. The lower ranking members of the organisation were the
brunt of the latter. The three CO'DH messengers found that no one was willing to
give them work, or allocate them the transport to do what little they could get
from other CO'DH employees. When one of them tendered his resignation to his
former Managing Director, the former head responded (as if to demonstrate he
still had authority) by fmding him a new job where he would be better
appreciated. The messenger was then appointed the assistant receptionist, a move
that put him totally out ofhis tether and succeeded to frustrate him even more.
Other disenchanted members of staff were two former board members- the New
Business Director and the Media Director, both who found themselves stripped of
their board privileges upon their arrival at BMOM, without prior warning. It was
a small wonder that both would leave within the next three months, taking with
them a considerable amount of business as their respective clients chose to follow
them to their new agencies rather than remain at BMOM. The former Traffic
Manager was put out of her depth when she was made an Account Executive
because there was no room for traffic in the agency's organisational structure.
4.3.2 The Zimbabwean Economy
A brief mention of the deteriorating economic conditions after the conclusion of the
merger talks needs to be mentioned here as the impact this would have a direct impact on
the 0 & M Group.
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The economy, which had continued to depreciate steadily took a sudden plunge with the
outcome of the March 2002 Presidential Elections. The immediate effect of this was as
follows:
• Investor confidence in the country dwindled to an all time low.
• Foreign Currency shortages continued. With this shortage the parallel market
which saw the price of the US$ rise to Z$1750 compared to the government's
unrealistically pegged rate of Z$55 continued to thrive.
• The government's answer to the currency shortages was to pass legislation
that outlawed dealing with foreign currency to all but the central bank:. Also to
impose strict price controls on just about every essential commodity. The
result of these price controls have been the critical shortages of all the basic
foodstuff and fuel. This has severely crippled the counny's industries.
The impact of the economy on the advertising industry as a whole was the
reduction of ad spend that clients were prepared to free for marketing purposes.
Further, the industries' suppliers relied heavily on imported products, which
meant the constant price increases of products and seIVices as suppliers sourced
for hard currency on the black marlcet. Few suppliers were able to guarantee any
quotation for more that 24 hours as they battled to keep up with the ever rising
rate of foreign currency. This meant that agencies were no longer capable of
guaranteeing cost advantages to their clients as they no longer controlled the
suppliers' prices. The net effect of this was a rise in the cost of advertising.
Companies could no longer effectively budget for their marketing plans. Many
withdrew from standard advertising as they looked for new ways to promote their
products.
Much of the economic upheaval in Zimbabwe had its basis in the uncertainty of
the country's political future. The prevailing government passed legislation that
had further repercussions on the advertising industry. In the run up to the March
elections, all sponsored programmes and commercial advertising in the country's
government controlled electronic media was suspended indefinitely. This meant
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that companies could no longer flighe 7 adverts for their products on TV or radio.
This was a major blow to advertising agencies as they immediately lost the 16.5%
commission on the total flighting costs that they accrued from each instance that
the advert was aired on television or radio. This also meant that any on going
plans to produce new advertising material for the electronic media were
immediately put on hold. Companies began to seek alternative means of
marketing their products. The most popular became the use of road shows and
outdoor advertising such as hoarding. While the mainstream advertising agencies
had good relationships with these companies, they were actually competition that
was now coming of age.
4.4 The Merger in Practice
In light of the prevailing economic conditions and the impact on the advertising
industry, the 0 & M Chairman, often expressed optimism based on the group's
new merged strength. In his assessment, the CUlTent economic downturn was a
misfortune faced by every agency in the country, but that the merger had
strengthened the Group's defence and thus 0 & M would remain the dominant
force in the industry. In his own words, ,the merger was progressing according to
plan, and the CO'DH staff were now settled in their new positions and had no
complaints about their new agencies. He would occasionally ask CO'DH
employees at both agencies if they were unhappy. Invariably they would say yes,
as they were not familiar enough with him to highlight any reasons why they
would not be happy. The Chairman unfortunately never looked beyond the
obvious at looming problems that could threaten 0 & M's position in the market.
Together with the Ogilvy and Mather Board, no attention was paid to the high
number of resignations that were occuITing as a result of the merger. The numbers
were uncharacteristically high even for the advertising industry18. At CM & A, 4
17 Refers to the insertion of advertising in the electronic or print media where one appearance is
referred to as a f1ighting.
18 The advertising Industry has notoriously high levels of staff turnover. According to A.L Chishiri
in his dissertation on the bpic in 1998, the normal rate is a whooping 60%. Explanations for this
high rate probably are the fact the industry tends to be incestuous in its recruitment of sl3ft. Very
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original members of the agency tendered their resignations just three months into
the merger. At Barkers, one after another of the former CO'DH members was
leaving on a monthly basis from the month that they arrived at Barkers. Clients
however noticed these changes and felt insecure about their businesses. Some
would move their accounts away from 0 & M and follow their contact persons as
they moved to other agencies. This happened at CM & A when the Vice-
Chairman resigned to start her own agency, and at Barkers when the former
CO'DH Media and New Business Directors left to join other agencies.
By June 2002, CM & A was a different agency in terms of its personnel composition to
the agency that represented the merger in October the previous year. Disgruntled with
aspects of the merger, the Vice Chairman had resigned taking with her the agency's
media manager, finance manager and studio manager to set up her own agency. In
months to come, she would also lure a few clients from CM & A to join them. On her
departure, the Vice-Chairman stated that among the reasons for her departure was the
lack ofcontrol she felt she no longer held in the agency. As one of the founding
members, she resented the fact that she had yet to be offered any shareholding
opportunities in the agency and loathed even more, the presence of a shareholder at CM
& A who could command more control because of this than she ever could. For nearly
twenty years, the Vice-Chairman had run the client services portfolio and CM & A with
formidable competence and was no doubt a valuable member of staff. Her fellow board
members underestimated the extent of her dissatisfaction with the merger, and failed to
address it from the onset. Her presence at the agency immediately following the merger
became destructive to the process because not only did she disagree with the group's idea
to merge in the first place, she felt threatened by it. The merger brought to CM & A the
fIrst suitably trained Account Manager. Unlike the ones she hired for CM & A, the
CO'DH AB was competent enough to handle larger portfolios than the ones she serviced
at CM & A. The Vice- Chairman was extremely unprofessional towards the AE and her
clients during those first three months of the merger. Her attitude unfortunately
seldom are positions advertised to industry outsiders. Someone familiar to the agency in one way
or another fills the vacancies.
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penneated through the ranks as those close to her chose to follow her stance. Again, the
CM & A board and the 0 & M board did nothing to address their grievances.
Their departure in December 2002 would however herald a breath of fresh air from CM
& A. In the New Year, considerable effort was made by the remaining members of staff
to create a better working environment where everyone got along for the common good
ofthe agency. This was difficult at first but bit by bit, headways were being made. Most
unifying was the Creative Director's suggestion to have a pub night every Friday for two
hours. The two groups began to relax in each other's company and even began to worlc
together towards a more successful agency. In some departments, members would sit
together and discuss the systems in place at CM & A and those that were used at CO'DH.
The most effective of the two would be chosen. The only strange thing about this
seemingly great integration that was taking place at the agency was that the Chairman
and the Managing Director played no part in the effort and continued to be indifferent
about the merger.
Things were no different at the Group level, as the Board did nothing to encourage
integration. What was worse, in June 2002, the Group's Chairman would follow a stance
that would jeopardise efforts in progress at CM & A and further unsettle CO'DH
members at BMOM by creating an irreparable wedge between the staff. The issue was
over bonuses and the position of the Chairman on this saw the majority of the remaining
employees at BMOM tender their resignations in the following month, leaving just four
of the original staff. At CM & A, three CO'DH members also resigned at the same time.
The following narration highlights the problem:
In practise at CO'DH, the Financial Director always made a monthly provision
for bonus payments in December every year. The amount was a predetermined
percentage of the month's net profit. This meant that the bonus payment at the
end of each year entitled staff anything up to a full thirteenth cheque. The advent
of the merger was not expected to alter this as 0 & M employees generally
received a thirteenth cheque every December. This however was not to be in
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2001. In a Christmas message attached to everyone's payslip, the Chainnan
thanked everyone for his or her stem efforts in making the merger effort work in
2001, citing however that unlike in previous years, the company could not afford
to pay the usual thirteenth cheques. As a gesture of goodwill however, everyone
was given a $ 10 000.00 bonus and reassurance that if the economic climate
improved in 2002, and in turn the group's business ventures, everyone could
indeed look forward to the usual bonus payment.
This explanation would have been acceptable had the Group not had a rethink on
the bonus issue at the end of the financial year in June 2002, when the decision to
pay all original 0 & M employees a 13th cheque was made. The whole move was
shrouded with secrecy that the two former shareholders of CO'DH (together 20%
shareholders of 0 & M Zimbabwe) were not even informed. When news of the
payments became evident and the 0 & M board was questioned about that, the
Chainnan's answer was that the money came out of coffers that CO'DH had not
contributed to as they had not been present during most of that financial year. The
Group's financial year ran from July to June. The merger was concluded in
September. Did nine months of CO'DH's contribution count for nothing? Further,
if in December there had been no money to payout bonuses, how now, six
months later, and with Carroll O'Donovan Hardy on board was there suddenly
enough, but none due from their portfolio? It was a sad day for the merger. What
little integration that had materialised in the past nine months suddenly counted
for nothing as employees' egos were bruised beyond repair. For the first time, one
of the former CO'DH shareholders admitted that the merger was not the best
option that Carroll O'Donovan Hardy could have pursued. If anything, it became
blatant that the merger was never one of equals, rather that CO'DH was
swallowed by the more voracious 0& M group and forced into extinction.
Uncharacteristically, the Chainnan and Managing Director of CM & A took a
stand against the Group's Chairman and authorised the drawing of money from
the agency's petty cash (so that the group's chainnan would never know) to pay
their seven CO'DH members of staff 13th cheques. The cash payments however
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were accompanied by a verbal caution not to repeat what had happened to their
former colleagues at BMOM as the two were acting of their own will against the
express desires of their leader. While this action went a long way to demonstrate
CM & A's renewed commitment to its employees, the final seed of discontent had
been sowed. In the following month, all but seven of the original staff members
(the remaining number that included the two shareholders) tendered in their
resignation and left the two agencies by the end of July 2002.
Following the bonus issue, the CM & A Chairman would hand in his resignation and
abdicate total control of the agency to the managing director and limit his involvement
with clients to the bare minimum for the remainder of the year that he served as his notice
period. He never publicised his reasons for the departure.
With this mass departure, it became impossible to maintain the fa~ade to CO'DH
clients at the two agencies that all that had changed was the name oftheir agency.
Gradually the former CO'DH clients began to move, often to follow their contact
people to their new agencies. By the end of 2002, what remained of the 0 & M
group was no longer a reflection of the merging of three agencies, rather, the
situation as it was before merger with less than a third of the original CO'DH
clients still on board. The board began to realise the diminishing returns of the
merger and began to think of a solution to solve the problem. They strangely
believed that the answer lay in the acquisition of another agency despite the
obvious failure of the group's management to consolidate the merger with
CO'DH. The group was engaged in merger talks with another agency at the time
of concluding this dissertation.
In order to effectively evaluate the merger, the next sections of this chapter will highlight
the prevailing practices and analyse their effectiveness using the literature gathered in
chapter 2. Responses from the questionnaire will also be included By way of conclusion,
the researcher will then consider whether or not the merger can succeed.
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4.5 Organisational Culture
A comprehensive analysis of the culture within the 0 & M group reveals that
there were three different culture types present at the time of the merger. In order
to clearly assess the role that culture plays in the organisation, it is important to
review the strengths and weaknesses of the three cultures in a positive and
constructive manner.
The merger of CODH and O&M brought together conflicting organisational
cultures without factoring in the time line needed to match them. As a result of
BMOM's domineering behaviour and unshared organisational culture, there was
disorganised activity as indicated by the cultural sharing, relative deprivation and
activity model suggested by David and Singh. The merger at BMOM brought in a
sophisticated service culture to an agency that relied on manual, traditional
methods and suppressed the former. The result was a huge loss of CO'DH
customers and employees.
At CM & A, the merger initially created integration problems due to the
contrasting organisational cultures of the two merging agencies. CO'DH was
extremely informal in interpersonal relationships, more aggressive and more
service oriented. CM & A was rather conservative and formal in interpersonal
relationships and more production oriented. The integration that was eventually
fostered through good communications' between the employees resulted in a
hybrid culture that embraced the beliefs of both agencies for the common good of
the combined CM & A.
Based on the questionnaire, respondents were asked to answer a multiple choice
of 8 questions twice. The first instance required answers for their pre merger
agency environment and the second for the new merged agency. Not surprisingly,
the original BMOM employees had the same answers for both exercises as they
felt nothing had changed for them with the advent of the merger. For CM & A
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and Carroll O'Donovan Hardy employees however, there was a marked
difference in their responses pre merger and post merger.
In summary, these were the findings of the research on each of the prevailing
cultures:
4.5.1 Barker McCormak Ogilvy and Mather Pre merger:
• Emphasis of work was on pulling together in various group efforts that the
employees belonged to. Staff was divided into strategic work teams. The
employees generally had little interaction with the other groups.
• Group members tended to regard themselves as associates or colleagues
(60%) and even as family or friends 25%). Outside the groups however, many
felt that they were merely contracted employees(95%)
• Relationships between work units thus tended to be competitive as the groups
were driven to out perform each other.
• Decisions relating to the group work were left to the group to decide on the
best course of action. Overall the Managing director in consultation with the
chairman made decisions that specifically affected the whole agency.
• The autonomy given to the work groups was incredible and many site this ·as
the reason for their remaining in this fairly strict and formal agency.
4.5.2 Barker McCormack Ogilvy and Mather Post merger as answered by
CO'DH employees:
• 80% of the employees felt they were treated as contracted employees and an
unsettling 20% as hired help.
• There were many unwritten rules. This stemmed from the members' difficulty
to fit in with the established group work type ofstructure.
• The formal structure of decision making was also very difficult for the
members to adapt to.
• 100% of the members enjoyed their environment less than before. Of the
many that left, these were some of the reason given:
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• "Management too aloof and unconcemed about the individual welfare of the
staff'.
• ''Environment too unfriendly"
• " The atmosphere was far from wann"
• Work groups were too rigid and could not accommodate another member
much less consider their views".
4.5.3 Barker McCormack Ogilvy and Mather Post merger as answered by
Original employees:
The answers remained the same as in the pre merger scenario.
4.5.4 CM & A Pre Merger:
• Priority was placed on individual performance. 95% of the respondents felt
the most important aspect of the agency was the meeting of the challenges of
the individual tasks in which they were involved.
• This individual effort would lead 50% of the employees to feel like contracted
employees and an additional 30% to consider their position in the agency as
that of Hired Help.
• There was an incredible force played by organisational politics in the agency.
The lack of a clear reporting structure would align staff into cliques that
shared anything from meals to agency information. The extent of the agency
politics would only be felt with the dismantling of one of these cliques with
the departure of the agency's vice chairman. The result would he the heralding
of a new atmosphere ofco-operation in the merged agency.
• The agency was thus govemed by some unwritten rules that the employees
came to understand.
4.5.5 CM & A Post Merger as answered by CO'DH employees:
• Initially a total culture shock, CO'DH employees found it difficult to adapt to
the non-teamwork way of doing things. This was sited as a reason for leaving
by one member.
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• The organisational politics was also too deep rooted for the CO'DH members
to appreciate as they were not members of any of the cliques 'in place. Post
merger, 90% of the respondents felt that their priority as employees was to act
within the parameters of their job description and 100% felt they were treated
as hired help by management. A good employee in their new agency was
considered one who always carried out the instructions received from their
superior.
• Asked to describe their contentment levels after the mergerlOO% enjoyed their
environment less than before.
4.5.6 CM & A as answered by its original employees
• With the change in leadership for most departments, some CM & A
employees (50%) grew to feel that a greater priority in their wolk depended
on how effectively they followed instructions form their superiors while 35%
began to see co-operating with fellow workers a priority. Interestingly 5% of
the respondents enjoyed their job/environment more after the merger
• 60% now considered agency members as colleagues or associates compared
with a previous 15%.
• Relationships between work units became more co operative and less
indifferent.
4.5.7 CO'DH Pre Merger:
• Employees largely considered each other as associates or colleagues (50%) or
as family or friends (50%).
• The onus was on teamwork and everyone understood this. This aspect of the
CO'DH culture was known to the agency's client who knew to call upon
anyone regardless of their portfolio in the agency for any requests that they
may have had.
• Decisions were generally made by those individuals close to the problem and
often made on the spot.
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• In order to be accepted at CO'DH, one had to know how to get along with
their co-workers. In other words, become a team player.
4.5.8 How Management Should Have Addressed Organisational Culture
Issues:
• Management should have acknowledged the three different organisational
cultures present.
• An assessment of each type of culture should have been carried out so as to
establish the most positive aspects ofeach type.
• A desired culture for the merged agencies should have been outlined in
keeping with the organisation's strategic vision, objectives, and financial
performance and market positioning strategy.
• Encourage an open mind both at management level and below to accept that
adopting a new way of life would be difficult at first but accept that these
difficulties could be worked through.
According to Kenneth David and Harbir Singh, When full integration of resources
is required for a post-acquisition strategy, then even minor cultural distance can
be a problem - even in the case of a seemingly friendly merger between
strategically related companies. Culture distance is not an implacable force, but it
can be manipulated in line with one's practical interests: over communicated in
order to wreck alliances or under communicated in order to forge them.
Hall and Notbum (1987) developed two hypotheses that they used to match the
culture between partnering organisations.
• Hypothesis 1. The extent to which there exists a fit between the culture of the
acquiring organisation and the acquired organisation will be directly
correlated to the success of the acquisition.
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• Hypothesis 2. Where a lack of fit in organisational culture exists, the success
of the acquisition is detennined by the amount of post acquisition autonomy
granted to the acquired organisation.
For CM &A, the first hypothesis probably held true. What lacked was the
recognition and the follow through efforts to amalgamate the two cultures. Most
of the worJ.e to integrate the two agencies had miraculously taken place with little
acknowledgement from top management. To some degree, the new CM & A had
by the time of writing, embraced a hybrid culture that reflected the two earlier
cultures. This is reflected in the post merger culture section's responses from the
original CM & A members.
For Barkers, however, the second hypothesis holds true. At the very least, the
management at Barlcers should have acknowledged the huge culture differences
and tried to integrate the two by allowing members of CO'DH some autonomy
within their sphere of influence. The agency could have even pursued a deliberate
policy of internally running the former agency's business as an agency within an
agency. This would probably have resulted in a separation mode of acculturation,
which however as stated in Chapter 2 is not without its problems. The main
problem being that it cultivates a fair amount of conflict and is exceptionally
difficult to implement. However for a fixed time period, while a more lasting
solution was being derived, this would have been the best alternative at Barlcers
because as the dominant party, it was natural for BMOM to prefer to maintain
their culture. This preference should however, have been considered closely with
the dominance of the acquired party's culture and its acculturation mode. In the
case of Carroll O'Donovan Hardy, the culture was very strong and was a
distinguishing identifYing criterion from other agencies. It denoted fun and
spontaneity - very difficult variables to let go of. The CO'DH members thus
developed a very negative perception of the BMOM ''way''. Sadly no effort was
made by either agency group to understand the other's culture. With the rapid
resignations of CO'DH members that took place at BMOM, it has become
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practically impossible to examine even slight traces of the CO'DH culture within
the agency.
4.6 Change Management
Based on the theory derived, human beings are abject to any changes in their
routine. The onset of the merger would predictably unsettle all the employees in
all the three agencies as they contemplated their future in the combined group.
What management should have done from the onset was to prioritise the human
resource element in their merger talks. This would have helped to clearly outline
the change process in a manner that would be least disruptive to the day to day
running of the business. According to John Lawrie's change model, some
disharmony must be anticipated at the beginning - before the organisation can
progress to the transition and new levels. Also management should have realised
that the adoption processes would be different at the two 0 & M agencies because
of the fusion of different organisational cultures..
At CM & A, it was not only the new comers from CO'DH that were affected, but
the existing members of staff as well. There was a considerable amount of tension
that emanated from the introduction of a 10% 0 & M shareholder in a company
that had long been run by mere employees that had risen in rank to Chairman,
Managing Director and Vice-Chainnan. The threat of having an owner on board
was very evident and permeated down the ranks were his presence to those
originally from CM & A caused significant discomfort as people did not quite
know where he ranked particularly after assuming the role of the agency's
Creative Director. The laissez faire operations at CM & A were also very
difficult for the CODH employees to understand much less cope with. Coming
from an agency that valued teamwork, being left to one's devices was an
insurmountable challenge for the employees concerned and also for their clients
that had learned to liase with just about anyone in the agency if they required
anything.
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At Barkers, due to its size, it was unlikely that the original members of staff
would experience any major changes in their daily routine following the merger.
Adversely, the impact for the CO'DH employees was made even greater by this
scenario as it tended to relegate them to a contemptuous existence within the
agency. The move for those who went to Barkers was described as a step back in
time in more ways than one. The systems that the CO'DH employees had been
used to did not exist at BMOM. Not that there were no systems present at the
agency, but they were neither modem nor standard as they tendered to vary
between worlc groups. CO'DH members did not always understand the objectives
of the worlc group as they were not written down, but created through years of
understanding between members of the worlc groups, this made life even harder
for them at Barkers. The accounts department at BMOM ran a manual accounting
system. When the two clerks from CO'DH expressed their horror, they were told
to adjust and adjust and cope with prevailing practise or be free to look elsewhere
for employment. The thought of implementing a computerised accounting system
as was in place at CO'DH was never even discussed at board level before the
merger.
In keeping with the literature in Chapter 2, it is critical to use the 10 elements of a
successful change process to analyse how effectively the group handled this major
element in its merger.
1. Mobilise commitment to change through joint diagnosis ofbusiness problems.
All those affected by the element of change should have met to discuss their
views and fears and the adoption of a suitable manner in which they could live
through the process. This point was particularly ignored at CO'DH where
information of which agency the employees were going was kept a tightly
guarded secret until the week prior to the proposed move. Further, demotions
that were known will take place by the shareholders were not communicated
to the relevant personnel. At CM & A and BMOM, management did not
anticipate that the merger. They felt that the CO'DH employees would be the
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only ones who would face the challenges occasioned by the change, but that in
a matter of time they would adjust to their new environments. This oversight
came at a huge loss at CM & A when the agency lost both long-standing
members of staff and clients.
What the three agencies needed to do was to come up with a common goal in
terms of a proposed vision for the group and the individual agencies. With this
vision in mind, the following steps should have been undeltaken out in order to
effectively carry the change process through:
• Nominating a senior member of staff at Group level, who would in turn
nominate unit heads to champion the change process. Someone committed to
the success of the merger and one who would hold empathetic views for all
the parties involved.
• Under this Change Master's guidance, a suitable programme for the change
would be designed in terms of the time frame involved, resources required and
the implication of this on the organisations long term goal in terms of the
stakeholders: customers, shareholders, employees, suppliers etc.
• A review of the current organisations' strengths and weakness Vis a Vis the
groups ultimate goals regarding their customers and employees.
2. Creation of a shared vision and Common direction. This would have gone a
long way in developing a united pull to deal with the challenges that were
posed by the merger.
3. Separate from the past. What everyone needed to leam and accept was that
there should no longer have been CODH or a CM & A or even a Barkers way
of doing things, rather a new way that embraced the beliefs of each of the two
groups in both remaining agencies. The past should have ceased to become an
alternative, except in the interest of common good and with the approval of all
the merged parties.
4. Create a sense of urgency. The only constant in our lives today is change.
Everything else does not stand still. With this philosophy in mind, the change
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effOlt at the 0 & M agencIes would have been accorded the priority it
deserved.
5. Strong, supportive and committed top management. Without this critical
factor, any change effort at the agencies was doomed to fail. Top management
lacked a passion for the transition and in instances encouraged regressive
behaviour, which destroyed the merger's potential to succeed.
6. Open and Honest Communication. 100% of the respondents felt the flow of
infonnation regarding the merger was inadequately handled by their superiors.
In fact most answers to the 13 questions on Change Management rank
between 1 and 2 - Not at all and inadequateLy in tenns of how well
management handled various aspects of the change process. Top management
totally ignored the impact that the change process would have on individuals
and the agencies alike. After the merger, subordinates developed a certain fear
for authority and never quite revealed their true feelings. None of the CO'DH
employees ever challenged the union or said they were not happy when asked
by the group's Chainnan, yet they were resigning in large numbers. Most
argue that the Chainnan did not ask the question out of genuine concern,
rather as a way of making some conversation with characters he did not know
nor care to spend the time to do so and as such, deserved their insincerity.
7. DeveLop enabling systems. In embracing a new beginning, different structures
would have to be set up to ensure the success of the process. This would
include a fonnalised organisational structure at CM & A to depict clear
reporting lines, and the inclusion of the new comers into the existing structure
at Barkers.
8. Institutionalise change through formaL policies, systems and structures. In the
absence of a leader to guide the group through the change process, this
element could not possibly be adopted at 0 & M.
9. Monitor and adjust strategies in response to probLems in the change process
impLementation. Again the absence of a lead~r rendered this point ineffective
atO&M.
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10. Create enabling culture. This would have required a thorough assessment of
the culture in place. As discussed in the section above, the most suitable
culture would be one that embraced the dominant and most acceptable traits of
each type present.
Change is a particularly difficult aspect of any merger. How it is managed plays a
pivotal role in the overall success of the merger. At 0 & M, the change process
was not managed at all by any of the three agencies. It was treated so lightly as
though the powers that be felt the problems created therein would just go away by
themselves. Failure to embrace even some of the essential elements of a
successful change model resulted in major dishannony within the group amongst
employees and some of the customers who were never fully cautioned about
likely changes of operation that would be brought about by the merger.
4.7 Organisational Structure
Organisational structure is defined in accordance with the following parameters:
• How jobs are defined
• How various jobs are combined or grouped
• The appropriate size of each group and the relevance of this to the entire
organisation
• Management's span of control
• Reporting relationships
• How people and technology are integrated
• How the organisation is exposed to the outside world
• How authority will be distnbuted.
CO'DH was too top heavy from the beginning. A classic case, of the proverbial
"too many chiefs and no Indians". It would have been impossible to maintain all
its directors at board level within a group that in total sat fewer members on its
board. The shareholders at Carroll O'Donovan Hardy failed to practise total
honesty with their employees particularly to the two directors and traffic
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managers who found new portfolios awaiting them at BMOM. The structure at
CO'DH was such that the only clear reporting scenario was directly to the
Managing Director. In the events leading to the merger, the Managing Director
did not fully exercise his authority in informing all the staff about details of the
merger that would affect their careers. He also delayed releasing information
about who went to which agency, thus created undue tension among the staff.
The prevailing structure at CO'DH also did very little to train the employees that
in most organisations, a structured reporting pattern is normal. They were too
used to presenting any grievances that they had to the Managing Director as he
carried out his daily walk about, that they held the reporting structures in place at
CM & A and Barkers with disdain.
From a technology point of view, CO'DH had boasted openly at pitches that no
other agency in the country embraced technology like it did. Every employee at
the agency had a computer with access to the Internet. The agency was also
networked to facilitate the easy share of information. The creative and account
department's staff often underwent training to keep abreast the ever-evolving
technology.
Like many modem agencies, CO'DH had a Traffic manager to co ordinate the
flow of work within the agency. This position was considered key to helping
maintain the agency's proposed turn around times to its clients. It provided for a
person who knew absolutely everything about all the clients' work. Learning to
cope without traffic at the new agencies presented a myriad of problems for the
CO'DH members. These problems were manifested by missed deadlines, as the
responsible parties could not come up with workable critical path schedules in the
light of their new environments. Fortunately for CO'DH clients at CM & A, the
agency embraced the idea of Traffic management as a good idea and appointed
the production assistant to run it. At Barkers however, the breaking down of
employees into work groups meant that each group was totally responsible to the
client for absolutely every task. Witlrin the group, deadlines and duties were
assigned and it was easy for the established group members to stick to them, as
communication was open. There was therefore "no room" for a traffic function at
the agency. Something the shareholders overlooked when they billeted the
CO'DH traffic manager to BMOM.
CM & A was run through the consultation of three people - the chairman, vice
chairman and the managing director. All three directors were full time employees
of the agency. Beyond the Vice-Chairman's leadership role in Client Services, it
was not very clear exactly who was responsible for what within the agency. This
made it particularly difficult to assign any reporting relationships within the
agency. Departments generally found a favourite out of the three and used them to
channel their grievances. Pre merger, there was very little rapport between most
of the employees as they tended to segregate themselves in line with their "chosen
leader".
The agency's lack of a Creative Director for over two years had made CM & A's
position vulnerable within the market place. Most of the creative work was
derived from frequent brainstorming sessions and then presented to a free lance
copywriter. This was not a bad thing except that the members of staff did have
their daily duties to do as well and brainstorming is a time consuming exercise.
From a technology point of view, CM & A was less the innovator that CO'DH
was but more the adopter. Like CO'DH, everyone had a computer and email
access. The Internet however was a preserve for the directors. This would remain
unchanged even after the merger. CO'DH members would argue quite correctly
that they required access to the wealth of information on the Net if the agency was
to succeed. The Managing Director however considered unlimited access to the
Internet costly in terms of money and time that he felt would now be concentrated
on the Net rather than on pending work.
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The structure at BMOM was the most formal of the three structures. It mapped
out clear lines of authority and reporting functions. The type of arrangement in
place had worked well in the past for the agency. The advent of 14 new members
of staff however could not be easily accommodated as it threatened to alter the
status quo. As a result, the new employees never came to know to whom they
were ultimately answerable. Whenever in doubt, they reported their grievances to
their former managing director (who himself was now a mere director with no
particular group portfolio), and hoped that he could solve their problems - which
very often he no longer could.
From a group point of view, there was very little interference on the day to day
running of the agencies. The group boanl met every second month to discuss
issues of common interest to both agencies.
For its type of business, 0 & M should have attempted to adopt fairly flat
structures in both its agencies. This would encourage a free flow of
communication and power within the agencies allowing them to be more
. responsive to customer needs. The chosen structure strategy should have been one
to support the sales and marketing goals of the group by outlining a clear flow of
information between the agency's staff and its customers. Further, a flat structure
would have deleted the duplication of efforts (particularly at CM & A) whilst
merging core activities.
The impact of technology as a distribution channel should not have been lost to
management. What happened to the CO'DH accounting staff at BMOM was most
unfortunate. From a group level a champion for the integration of the technology
should have been appointed at the time of the merger. This would have helped in
reducing certain tensions that were the cause of the varied levels of technology in
place at the three agencies. CO'DH ran a hybrid of MacIntosh and PC software in
its creative studio. This helped the agency achieve compatibility with clients and
supplier software without having to outsource work for conversion. CM & A ran
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MacIntosh only and BMOM ran PC's only. The resulting frustrations for the
CO'DH artists at their new studios was understandable but unfortunately not
addresses by management. At Barkers, a computer on one's desk was a preselve
for secretarial staff and management. Much was carried out in a manual fashion
and there was very little hope for change in the near future. With the arrival of
CO'DH, a network was put in place but it effectiveness was greatly reduced due
to the limited access that members of staff had to it.
4.8 Leadership
The group lacked the charisma of a leader who had faith in the merger. There was
no one to drive the merger from its inception, ensuring a sure failure in the future.
Referring back to the literature on leadership, a selling style would have been
appropriate for the entire group. This leadership style is best suited to an
environment where there is a high need for direction but the input of sub ordinates
is valuable as they have a high contact rate with customers. This leadership style
would also have been aptly matched to the M2 type (Moderate Maturity)
followers. The group's organisational effectiveness would have been enhanced
through this correct matching.
Leadership is the core driver in the organisation's ability to manage culture,
change and opportunity cohesively and move towards the organisations strategic
vision. Matching of leadership style and maturity of followers according to the
Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership Theory would enhance the 0 & M
Group's effectiveness. Management adaptability was required to manage the cross
cultural advertising operations that were merged at CM & A and at Barkers.
While the different situations called for different leadership styles, the common
elements of a successful leader in both cases would have been one of a visionary,
with a strong and close focus on the business operations.
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4.9 Summary
Having completely evaluated the case of the merger between CO'DH and the 0& M
group of Zimbabwe against the theory model, it is .apparent then~ was no effort put in
place to ensure the success of the merger. While considerable strides were made at CM &
A, the lack of involvement of the agency's board members would cripple any chances of
future success. With both CO'DH and CM & A members affected by the merger, top
management realised far too late that the implications of their mismanagement of key
issues would result in the loss of critical members of staff and clients. The scenario at
BMOM was particularly poor and did nothing but destroy any positive elements that
were expected to be derived from the merger.
The major drawbacks to the merger evolved from the following problems:
• Underestimating the role-played by culture in an organisation.
• Underestimating the difficulties ofmerging two cultures.
• Underestimating the problems ofskills transfer.
• Demotivation of employees especially from CM & A and CO'DH.
• Too much energy involved in concluding the deal with little or no emphasis paid to
post merger strategies, planning and integration.
• Unclear responsibilities that delay decision making and reduce accountability.
• Neglecting existing businesses and paying attention to none revenue-generating
matters.
• The groups misguided notion that mergers are the only possible ways ofgrowth
In view of the weakening position of the Ogilvy and Mather group in the Zimbabwean
advertising industry, the next chapter will conclude this research by offering
recommendations on ways to overcome the problems posed by the merger and suggest





In view of the infonnation gathered in this dissertation so far, the first fifteen months
following the conclusion of the merger between Carroll O'Donovan Hardy and the
Ogilvy and Mather Group of Zimbabwe illustrated classic shortcomings in the post
merger management of organisations. What the merger had set out to achieve in tenns of
increased revenue and long tenn sustainability failed because management neglected to
pay attention to the pertinent issues of organisational culture, structure and change
management. The implications of merging two organisations, which varied dramatically
on these variables, had not been considered at the time of the merger. In the absence of
visionary leadership, these issues continued to be ignored during the merger's operation
even when associated problems such as employee resignations and customer defections
reared their heads. This chapter will outline the strategic requirements that ensure success
after a merger. These strategic areas will be based on effective organisational culture,
organisational structure change management and leadership. The importance of these
strategic variables in a post merger environment has been emphasised throughout the
dissertation. In view of the conditions at 0 & M in December 2002, where the group was
losing its market dominance due to the high number of staff resignations and the loss of
key accounts, this chapter will suggest growth strategies that a company at 0 & M's stage
of a merger can still adopt in order to guarantee some success in customer and employee
retention and eventually overall business growth. Most importantly, the chapter will
suggest perfonnance measures that will ensure the group stays on its chosen track.
As a conclusion to this dissertation, a brief outline at opportunities for further study will
be carried out.
5.2 Recommendations on Successful Post Merger Strategies
Recommendations on successful post merger strategies in tenns oforganisational culture,
organisational structure, change management and leadership are as follows:
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5.2.1 Organisational Culture
• A comprehensive analysis of the existing cultures should be done. Cultural strengths
and weaknesses should be reviewed in a positive and constructive manner in onler to
get key issues out in the open.
• The organisation should then develop shared organisational culture to neutralise
relative deprivation.
• The characteristics of the desired culture should be defined based on strategic vision,
key objectives and financial objectives and maIket-positioning strategy. This will
reinforce and clarify the organisation's focus, as well as management's commitment
to the change process itself.
• Strong performance and sales culture are essential in the modern advertising industry.
5.2.2 Organisational Structure
• Strategy, Technology, People, Size and Structure should be considered in determining
an organisational structure.
• Merging organisations should adopt flat structures with highly skilled, empowered,
team oriented and communicating employees.
• The organisational structure should be supportive of a sales and performance culture.
5.2.3 Change Management
• Education and communication, participation and involvement and negotiation and
agreement methods should be used in dealing with resistance to change to minimise
performance and morale drop in the transition phases.
• The change process should mobilise commitment to change through joint diagnosis of
business problems. It should create shared vision and common direction. It must
separate from the past and create a sense of urgency. It must have strong supportive
and committed top management. It must also have open and honest communication;
develop enabling systems. The change process must be institutionalised through
formal policies, systems and structures that allow for the monitoring and adjustment
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strategies ill response to problems ill the change implementation and create an
enabling culture.
• In today's modem business environment, the unfreeze, change and refreeze process
should be managed as a dynamic process.
5.2.4 Leadership
• Matching of leadership style and maturity of followers enhances organisational
effectiveness.
• Transformational leadership enables followers to perform beyond expectations.
• Leaders who are focused, visionary, strong and close to the business operations are
more effective.
The Ogilvy and Mather Group of Zimbabwe had by December 2002, failed to hamess
these strategic requirements to ensure the success of their merger with Carroll
O'Donovan Hardy TBWA fifteen months after the merger was concluded. The Group
had suffered heavy losses of qualified personnel and key clients. The Group's position as
the market leader in the Zimbabwean advertising industry was by now extremely
compromised. If the group did nothing to address the problems, it would clearly lose its
dominant control of the marlcet.
In view of the resounding failure at post merger management at the Group, it would be
best for 0 & M to consider other types of growth strategies that could help them in
maintaining their number one position in terms of billings and production. These
strategies would take into account the reality of the merger that is still present at the
Group, such as the remaining employees at CM & A and the Barkers employees
originally from CO'DH as well as key accounts that came from CO'DH at both agencies.
The main focus of these growth strategies would be aimed at customer and employee
loyalty and retention.
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5.3 Alternative Growth Strategies
Mergers and acquisitions form part of the growth strategies of organisations. The
objectives of this section are to illustrate that there is more to growth strategies than
mergers and acquisitions. This section will focus on sustainable competitive strategies, as
according to Mark N. Clemente and David S. Greenspan.
'Mergers fail when integration is slow and overly focused on the cost reduction synergies
instead of the strategic synergies that generate top line revenues' (Clemente and
Greenspan, 1998).
Cost reduction only saves money but does not build businesses~ therefore in a post-
merger environment, customer loyalty and retention and integrated business unit
strategies are core in developing sustainable competitive growth strategies.
There is strong anecdotal evidence that many customers, especially retail and small
businesses customers grow disenchanted after a merger as service fees increase, service is
disrupted and there is a shift in strategy, which marginalises them (Milligan, 1998). This
was clearly the case at 0 & M. CO'DH clients felt extremely compromised when their
liaisons with the agencies resigned and the service levels they were used to were altered.
In order to grow a business like an advertising agency it is important to understand what
attracts customers. According to research by Fred Reichheld (Morrall, 1996) there are




• Location and Convenience
Developing growth strategies that take into account the above would increase the chances
of improving customer loyalty and retention after a failed merger.
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This chapter will detail two growth strategy models, critical success factors for growth
strategies, economic value added (EVA) and balanced score can! (BSC) as performance
measures and review growth strategies in the service industry.
5.3.1 Growth Strategy/Growth Capability Model
This section will discuss the Growth Strategy/Growth Capability model by Buxton and
Davidson (Buxton and Davidson, 1996). This model has been chosen as it emphasises the
importance of growth capability in developing a sustainable growth strategy after a
merger in the service industry sector
Service industries seeking to deliver superior returns must· look not only to develop
growth strategy, but also to create growth capability, which is the ability to sustain
growth. The definitions below illustrate the differences between growth strategy and
growth capability.
"Growth Strategy is a plan to commit resources to achieve growth-providing, competitive
advantage through new technologies and products, new markets and ways to markets and
ways to serve them, globalisation, partnerships, and any other means of improving
strategic positioning" (Buxton and Davidson, 1996).
"Growth capability refers to a company's business processes and organisation,
harmonised in the never ending pursuit of discovering, developing and delivering
superior value propositions to customers by satisfying existing needs and those that are
emerging from trends in the larger market place" (Buxton and Davidson, 1996).
Most companies in the advertising industry were able to ride the wave when the market
had excess demand. However, advertising industry services (in Zimbabwe) have now
become standard and mundane, as the market is now mature and saturated. Further due to
government legislation and policies, there has been a marked decrease in certain forms of
advertising that involve the electronic and print media. This calls for new strategies as
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
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Creating competitive advantage to ride a major Maintaining sustained competitiveness: the endless
wave of demand building and rebuilding of competitive advantage by
developing and delivering attractive, new value
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As the wave ebbs.......................... Make our own waves




Doing the old things doesn't work: with reduced Finding sources ofgrowth through focused value
competitiveness in a mature industry proposition despite industry maturity
Weak Source: (Buxton and Davidson, 1996)
Growth Capability
Strong
As agencies slump from Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 2, they need to develop robust, effective
and innovative strategies to enable them to ultimately reach Quadrant 4. In order to
achieve this, agencies should continuously and simultaneously engage in actions on the
Four Growth Fronts as illustrates in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2 Actions on the Four Growth Fronts
Source: (Buxton and Davidson, 1996)
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The mega-mergers trend in the service industry is meant to create new markets with few,
if any rivals, in order to preserve competitive advantages for long periods (Achi and
Others, 1995). "Getting Better" and "Getting Different" strategies will help companies
provide radically improved products and services to customers, thereby creating entirely
new markets and shaping the industry structure in the markets they create. For example,
alliances of technology companies, Internet companies and retailers are being entered
into in older to create a business web, which sustains competitive advantage.
In order for the growth strategy and capability to be sustained, a culture that combines the
determination to achieve true leadership with the humility to learn from others people's
ideas must be developed (Buxton and Davidson, 1996). Ideas generated from the study of
Organisational Culture will be useful in this regaId. These include the realisation that
organisational learning and communication, tolerance and flexibility on the part of the
merging entities can lower the culture risk. Further that the staff of both merging parties
is open minded and flexible in their approach for a lasting solution.
5.4 Critical Success Factors for Growth Strategies
Clemente and Greenspan recommend a lO-step plan to instantly drive revenue growth.
1. Assemble a sales and marketing transition team
The team should ensure that the merged companies create immediate market momentum.
The majority of the sales personnel should be freed from administrative activities so that
they can concentrate on sales. As companies merge, a lot of publicity is inevitable. Sales
and marketing personnel should cease this opportunity to make use of the "free
advertising"
2. Conununicate information to protect existing customer relationships
Communication programs must promptly inform customers of the benefits they will
receive as a result of the transaction. As it is cheaper to maintain a customer than to
obtain a new one, it is therefore logical that communication in older to achieve profitable
customer loyalty and retention should be paramount in the early stages of the merger. In
the latter parts, the customer should remain leassured that the company values their
103
business and will do all in its power to maintain it. For 0 & M, the Agencies should have
ensured that they reaffIrm the group's commitment to the remaining clients and to act
upon that promise. Most importantly, Management should get to know all the clients
personally and seek to involve themselves at the decision-making levels of these clients
by creating a rapport with top management at the companies. The 0 & M Chairman's
philosophy of befriending your clients should become a binding one to all his senior
members of staff.
3. Detennine the product line and pricing structure
The merging partners should rationalise the product line and aggressively promote higWy
profitable product lines. The pricing of transactions should be discussed upfront to avoid
departmental conflict. in the case of CM & A where the Managing D~tor had a
dramatically different pricing structure, it is important for the key personnel at the agency
to meet and discuss the pros and cons of this strategy before suggesting a suitable way
that can standardise the agency's system.
4. Identify key competitors, including their products, pricing and positioning
Determining the priority of products must be followed by a comprehensive strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis of the key competitors. This
analysis will give a clear picture of the company's positioning in terms of its key
competitors in a manner that will allow it to better control or improve its position.
5. Articulate the brand positioning
To avoid confusion and the cost of multi branding, it is best to have a common branding
upfront, and explain any changes in branding due to the merger. By December 2002, CM
& A was renamed CM & A Ogilvy in a move that went with no publicity. The Group can
use the rebranding of CM & A to re affum its stronghold in the advertising industry.
6. Consolidate Customer Databases
This is probably the most daunting task especially when melding disparate technology
systems. Effective database marketing can create a powerful advantage as products and
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services would e tailored to the customer profile. Database marketing can also help the
company increase its share of the customer's wallet. One of the primary requirements of
this would be for BMOM to undergo a fully-fledged information technology oveIhaul
that would see the agency adopt the use of modem facilities such as computers and
networks. In addition to the infrastructural changes, the personnel would have to undergo
relevant training programmes to enable them to gain maximum advantage from the
technology.
7. Develop marketing communication and collateral materials
Product brochures and direct marketing materials must be expeditiously written,
produced and distributed through the new and broader marketing channels. In view of the
reduced exposure of traditional advertising channels, the Group needs to forge strategic
partnerships with related industry so as to devise new lines of product communication for
their customers.
8. Mobilise and train the sales force
Successful selling requires strong sales culture backed up by incentive compensation
programmes that encourage people to sell. In addition, sophisticated technology that
relies on large data warehouses and instant access from department, and intelligent
pricing policies that reward customers for concentrating their marketing relationship with
a single provider (Milligan, 1998).
9. Launch image advertising
Advertising from both a corporate image and product standpoint must be launched
instantly to facilitate sales efforts. The new entity should create a sense of expectation
about the 'new' company and then exceed it. The company should however make sure
that it delivers on what it promises; otheIWise it could suffer irreparable loss of credibility
and goodwill with customers .
105
10. Target the merged company's most profitable customers
The merged companies must focus their initial efforts on core customers that will drive
immediate profits. At the same time an inventory of unprofitable customers should be
done and these should be eliminated by subtle means like increasing fees and credit lines.
In the near term, marketing offensives should be aimed at customers who have been pin
pointed as likely buyers of specific products and services in the future based on their
purchase of specific products in the past. The broader market can be attacked over the
medium term.
Having discussed the growth strategy/growth capability model and critical success
factors, performance-measuring methods will be discussed in section 5.5, as they enable
the company to establish how effective their strategies are.
5.5 Performance Measures
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) based accounting and reporting
functions are losing relevance as tools for governance or strategically active companies.
To modem managers, GAAP is an encumbrance and the slowly evolving creature of
accounting institutes. Powerful new Perspectives may be gained by harnessing
methodologies such as Economic Value Added (BVA) and the Balanced Scorecard
(BSC) (Cates, 1997).
5.5.1 Economic Value Added (EVA)
• Conventional accounting measures like Retum on Equity (ROE) and Return on
Assets (ROA) fail to take into account the fact that shareholders require a risk related
return on capital, are backwanllooking and are subject to manipulation.
• EVA has been gaining favour as a measure of fmancial performance as it measures
the real profitability of a business after the total cost of its capital - debt and equity _
has been taken into account.
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• EVA therefore clearly ·shows whether shareholder value is being increased or
destroyed. By using EVA, companies can establish whether their growth strategies
are increasing shareholder value (one of the major drivers of mergers).
• EVA is however limited in that the restatements and estimates used in calculations
are generally not published, making it difficult to understand and verify EVA
achievements.
5.5.2 Balanced Scorecard (BSC)
• The BSC addresses a serious deficiency in traditional management systems: their
inability to link 10ng-teIID strategy with short-teIID actions.
• The BSC allows executives to introduce four new processes that, separately and in
combination contribute to linking 10ng-teIID strategy objectives with short-teIID
actions: translating the vision, communicating and linking, business planning and
feedback and learning as illustrated by figure 5.3.
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Source: (Kaplan and Norron, 1996)
The company would have to select quadrants within which to organise its performance
information or that of its business units. As an illustration, financial performance,





















The various measures are neither standard nor comparable. Each measure is indexed on
say a 1 to 5 scale, which would be benchmarked against competitors. A quadrant and
corporate (total) score can be calculated.
In monitoring the success of the growth strategy, the growth in financial performance
measurements should be compared to the performance of the other three quadrants~
customer base, service quality and organisational qualities. If the progress is not across
the board, this is an indication of the danger to the sustainability of the growth strategy.
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5.6 The Future of Ogilvy and Mather Zimbabwe
Management needs to accept that there are lessons to be learnt from the merger. This is
particularly important if the group maintains its current thinking that in order to maintain
the Group's matket dominance, they must acquire all competing agencies in the country.
They have to realise that in order to grow~ they must first look at the potential they hold
within. It is easier to maintain present business than to look elsewhere, especially in a
challenging economic environment. What is required at 0 & M is a clear vision of where
the organisation wants to be in the next few years and an outline of how it will get there.
The focal point of any strategy adopted by the group should prioritise the welfare of its
employees first, and then in turn the preservation and growth of its customers.
5.7 Summary and Conclusion
Customer loyalty and retention is an integral part of a growth after a merger. Growth
strategies should take into account the underlying reasons why people choose an
adveltising agency: people and service~ product and service and convenience. Agencies
must consider both growth strategy and growth capability in order to achieve superior
and sustainable growth.
New concepts like economic value added (EVA) and balanced scorecard (BSC) should
complement traditional performance measures like return of assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE) in order to establish risk adjusted returns and link the long-term growth
strategy to short-term actions.
5.8 Opportunities for Further Research
The study was largely based on secondary information. There is scope for detailed
primary research of the recommendations illustrated in this chapter. The research can
focus on anyone of the following topics or on all of them in terms of their importance in







The research could also be extended to the examination of successful post management
strategies that can be adopted in a hyperinflationary economic environment.
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As part of my MEA studies, I am doing a research project on Post Merger Management
Strategies within the Ogilvy and Mather Group in Zimbabwe. I would greatly appreciate
your input by answering the attached questionnaire as honestly as possible. The answers
provided will be treated with the snictest of confidence and are for use purely for
academic purposes. Your co-operation is appreciated.
The questionnaire is in the form of four sections: General Information, Change
Management, Culture and Leadership. Should you not understand what is required of you
in any part of the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to ask for clarification.
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SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE
SECTION 1: GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Which agency did you belong to in September 2001?
a.) Barker McComark Ogilvy and Mather
b.) CM&A
c.) Carroll O'Donovan
2. How long had you been with the agency?
a.) Less than a year
b.) One year to three years
c.) Three years to five years
d.) More than five years







4. Are you still employed within the 0 & M group?
a.) Yes
b.) No
5. If No please indicate the date that you resigned and briefly state your reasons for
leaving
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6. Ifyes, do you enjoy your job/environment after the merger?
a.) More than before




SECTION 2: CHANGE MANAGEMENT
How do you feel your superiors managed the following changes during the merger?
Answer where applicable to your circumstances, rating your answers on the table below
using the scale of 1 - 5 where:





1. Fear of the Loss of Identity you had
2. Your new role/continued role in the merged agencies
3. Any fears ofjob loss/demotion
4. Possible disruptions to your expected career path
5. Which agency you went to (CO'DH)
6. Any Loss of, or reduced power, status or prestige
7. Flow of information regarding the merged agency
8. The consistency of the information regarding the merger
9. Changes in rules, regulations, procedural and reporting arrangements
10. Changes in colleagues, bosses and subordinates
11. Ambiguous reporting systems, roles and procedures




















Consider the following items and choose the one response which most applied to Carroll
O'Donovan Hardy, CM&A Ogilvy or Barker McCormack Ogilvy and Mather. Indicate
your answer on the attached table in the first column marked ''Pre Merger" and repeat the
exercise, this time responding about the merged agency that is currently in place. Indicate
this answer in the column marked ''Post Merger"
1. In this agency, individuals were (are) expected to give first priority to:
a.) Meeting the challenges ofthe individual task in which they are involved.
b.) Cooperating with and attending to the needs oftheir fellow worlcers.
c.) Following the instructions of their superiors
d.) Acting within the parameters of their job description.
2. The agency respond(ed) s to its members as if they (were) are:
a.) Associates or colleagues
b.) Family or friends
c.) Hired help
d.) Contracted employees
3. In this agency, people are motivated and influenced most by:
a.) Their own commitment to the task
b.) The respect and commitment which they have for their co workers
c.) The prospects of reward or fear of punishment
d) The agency's unwritten "rules"
4. A 'good' employee is considered to be one who:
a.) Is self-motivated and willing to take risks and be innovative if the task
demands it.
b.) Gets along well with others and is interested in their self-development.
c.) Always does what hislher superior tells himlher to do without question.
d.) Can be relied on to stick to the agency's rules.
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6. In this agency, decisions tend(ed) to be:
a.) Made by the people on the spot that are close to the problem and have the
appropriate task expeltise.
b.) Made after considerable discussion and.with the consensus of all those
involved regardless of their position in the organization hierarchy.
c.) Referred up the line to the person who has the most formal authority.
d.) Made by resort to established procedures.
7. It is most important for a new member ofthis agency to learn:
a.) To use hislher initiative to get the tasks completed
b.) How to get on with hislher fellow workers
c.) Who really counts in this organization and be aware of political coalitions
d.) The formal rules and regulations
8. The dominant managerial style of this agency is:
a.) Democratic and open
b.) Supportive and responsive to individual needs and idiosyncrasies
c.) Authoritarian
d.) Impersonal and remote
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TABLEQ2










1. Is there a structured reporting pattern in your department?
a.) Yes
b.) No
2.Are you ever consulted on issues relating to your department?
a.) Yes always
b.) Sometimes but rarely
c.) Often
d.) Never





4. What do you feel about management's relay of important issues to the rest of the staff?
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a.) It is announced in a dictatorial manner with management's decision being
fmal.
b.) It is relayed in an impersonal manner through memos, emails etc
c.) Staff are asked to add their input if any
d.) It is announced in a pleasant but firm manner




d.) Not too sure
6. Who makes the decisions in your department?
a.) The department as a team
b.) Your Superior
c.) Don't know
d.) Some member of the depattment
7. Do you find your Superior?
a.) Easy going and approachable at all times
b.) Sometimes difficult to talk to
c.) Aloof
d.) Not sure






9. Regarding your confidence in your chosen career, do you feel that the actions of
management
a.) Improves your self esteem
b.) Diminishes your self esteem
c.) Disregards your self esteem
d.) Do not affect your self esteem





PRESENTATION OF DATA GATHERED
SECTION 1 GENERAL INFORMATION
Ifyou are no longer employed by the 0 & M Group Briefly State Reasons for
leaving?
• Management too aloof and unconcerned about the individual welfare of the staff
• Environment too unfriendly
• The atmosphere was far from wann
• Work groups were too rigid and could not accommodate another member much less
their views
• To get manied and leave the country
• Received an offer elsewhere that I could not refuse
• Became disillusioned with the industry after three key players had in my eyes failed
to combine into something meaningful
• Left to start my own agency
• Went to work: in a colleague's new agency
• I once looked forward to each new day at work, but by then I hated my job and knew
it was time to leave
• There was no scope for my future in the new agency
• Felt unjustly treated as I was demoted in rank without any warning
• I found the job less interesting and challenging than before
• Doubted the future of 0 & M in the face of the prevailing economic environment
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SECTION 2: CHANGE MANAGEMENT
BarkerMacCo~k
Figures denote percentage of respondents who selected that answer
QUESTION Not at all Inadequate Satisfactory Very Well Not
# Applicable
1 - - - - 100
2 - - - - -
3 - - - - -
4 - - - - -
5 - - - - 100
6 - - - - 100
7 - 100 - - -
8 - 100 - - -
9 - - - - 100
10 20 50 - - 30
11 - - - - 100
12 - 75 - - 25
13 - - - - 100
CM&A
Figures denote percentage of respondents who selected that answer
QUESTION Not at all Inadequate Satisfactory Very Well Not
# Applicable
1 55 45 - - -
2 100 - - - -
3 30 20 25 25 -
4 65 25 - - -
5 - - - - 100
6 25 75 - - -
7 - 100 - - -
8 - 100 - - -
9 80 20 - - -
10 100 - - - -
11 - 100 - - -
12 55 45 - - -
13 - - - - 100
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Carroll O'Donovan Hardy
Figures denote percentage of respondents who selected that answer
QUESTION Not at all Inadequate Satisfactory Very Well Not
# Applicable
1 100 - - - -
2 - 45 55 - -
3 20 80 - - -
4 - 60 40 - -
5 100 - - - -
6 100 - - - -
7 - 100 - - -
8 - 100 - - -
9 20 80 - - -
10 65 35 - - -
11 90 10 - - -
12 100 - - - -
13 - 60 - - 40
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SECTION 3 CULTURE
PRE MERGER RESPONSES TO SECTION 3: CULTURE
Figures denote percentage of respondents who selected that answer.
Barker MacConnack
QUESTION # a b c d
1 80 5 - 15
2 60 25 5 17
3 100 - - -
4 75 20 - 5
5 - - 55 45
6 95 - - 5
7 - 67 - 30
8 20 10 50 20
CM&A
QUESTION # a b c d
1 95 - 5 -
2 15 5 30 50
3 64 10 - 25
4 30 10 50 10
5 45 5 20 30
6 - - 100 -
7 - - 70 30
8 30 30 10 20
Carroll Q'Donovan Hardy
QUESTION # A b c d
1 85 - 15 -
2 50 50 -
3 100 - - -
4 100 - - -
5 45 55 -
6 75 - 25 -
7 100 - - -
8 90 - 10 -
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POST MERGER RESPONSES TO SECTION 3: CULTURE
Barker MacCormack by CO'DH
QUESTION # a b c d
1 - - 20 80
2 - - - 100
3 45 35 5 15
4 100 - - -
5 - - 10 90
6 5 95 - -
7 - 30 40 30
8 - - 100 -
CM & A BY CO'DH
QUESTION # a b c d
1 - - 10 90
2 - - 100 -
3 100 - - -
4 - - 90 10
5 - - - 100
6 - - 100 -
7 - - 90 10
8 - - - 100
CM&ABYCM&A
QUESTION # a b c d
1 10 35 50 5
2 60 10 10 20
3 60 10 5 24
4 30 10 50 10
5 60 30 10
6 - 15 85
7 5 35 50 10
8 30 10 30 30
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SECTION 4: LEADERSHIP
Figures denote pel'Centage of respondents who selected that answer.
QUESTION # a b c d
1 45 55 - -
2 40 20 10 30
3 25 40 15 20
4 - 100 - -
5 30 20 35 15
6 35 50 - 15
7 30 25 15 30
8 5 5 15 75
9 5 25 5 65




































Less Than 1 More than 1, less than 3 More than 3, less than 5 More than 5
Number of Years
r.Ba~er ~~rmao. ~!l~_~~8ther.~-M&A DCarroll, O'Donovan & Hardy I
How Long H8d You Been Employed by the Agency?
TABLE 3




Denotes % of those no longer employed by the group by agency
25% CM &A
75% CO'DH




How do you Enjoy Your Job/Environment After the Merger?
40% LESS THAN BEFORE
5% MORE THAN BEFORE
45% INDIFFERENT
10% DON'T KNOW
10%
LESS THAN
BEFORE
.MORETHAN
BEFORE
[] INDIFFERENT
[] DON'T KNOW
